Physical-Layer Security in Multiuser Visible Light Communication Networks by Yin, Liang & Haas, Harald
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Physical-Layer Security in Multiuser Visible Light
Communication Networks
Citation for published version:
Yin, L & Haas, H 2017, 'Physical-Layer Security in Multiuser Visible Light Communication Networks', IEEE
Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, pp. 162 - 174. https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2774429
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1109/JSAC.2017.2774429
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 11. May. 2020
IEE
E P
ro
of
IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS 1
Physical-Layer Security in Multiuser Visible
Light Communication Networks
Liang Yin and Harald Haas, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract— In this paper, we study the physical-layer security in1
a 3-D multiuser visible light communication (VLC) network. The2
locations of access points (APs) and mobile users are modeled as3
two 2-D, independent and homogeneous Poisson point processes4
at distinct heights. Using mathematical tools from stochastic5
geometry, we provide a new analytical framework to charac-6
terize the secrecy performance in multiuser VLC networks.7
Closed-form results for the outage probability and the ergodic8
secrecy rate are derived for networks without AP cooperation.9
Considering the cooperation among APs, we give tight lower10
and upper bounds on the secrecy outage probability and the11
ergodic secrecy rate. To further enhance the secrecy performance12
at the legitimate user, a disk-shaped secrecy protected zone is13
implemented in the vicinity of the transmit AP. Based on the14
obtained results, it is shown that cooperating neighboring APs15
in a multiuser VLC network can bring performance gains on16
the secrecy rate, but only to a limited extent. We also show17
that building an eavesdropper-free protected zone around the18
AP significantly improves the secrecy performance of legitimate19
users, which appears to be a promising solution for the design20
of multiuser VLC networks with high security requirements.21
Index Terms— Visible light communication, secrecy capacity,22
physical-layer security, poisson point process, stochastic23
geometry.24
I. INTRODUCTION25
BY UTILIZING the existing lighting infrastructure and26 shifting the communication frequency to the visible spec-27
trum, visible light communication (VLC) [1]–[3] has recently28
emerged as a promising candidate for future high-speed broad-29
band communications, which could effectively alleviate the30
spectrum congestion issue in current radio frequency (RF)31
based wireless systems. Recent advances have also led to the32
standardization of short-range wireless optical communication33
using VLC for local and metropolitan area networks [4],34
which serves as a major step towards its commercialization35
in the near future. Compared to RF communication, VLC36
has the following main advantages: 1) VLC builds upon37
existing lighting devices and operates on the license-free38
spectrum so that it has lower implementation cost; 2) VLC can39
operate safely in electromagnetic sensitive areas, where RF is40
intrinsically prohibited; 3) VLC networking can be designed in41
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addition to existing heterogeneous wireless networks because 42
it receives zero interference from, and adds zero interference to 43
its RF counterparts; 4) Based on the property that visible light 44
does not penetrate through opaque objects, the communication 45
bandwidth in one room can be efficiently reused in other rooms 46
to obtain a high frequency reuse factor and hence a high area 47
spectral efficiency; 5) Indoor VLC typically achieves higher 48
physical-layer security since the transmitted signal is confined 49
within the room. 50
The broadcast property of VLC has been utilized in many 51
novel designs of multiuser VLC networks [5]–[7]. However, 52
it also causes potential concerns to legitimate users and 53
network administrators regarding the information privacy and 54
confidentiality, especially in public areas, such as train sta- 55
tions and libraries. From an information-theoretic point of 56
view, the physical-layer security was pioneered by Wyner for 57
proposing the wiretap channel [8]: a channel in which an 58
eavesdropper receives a degraded version of the transmitted 59
signal. The degraded wiretap channel was later extended to 60
the non-degraded broadcast channel by Csiszár and Körner [9]. 61
In their seminal work, it is shown that perfect secrecy can be 62
achieved as long as the legitimate user has a less degraded 63
channel than the eavesdropper, and the secrecy capacity is 64
derived as the difference between the information capacity 65
for the two users. Typical security enhancement techniques 66
that are implemented at upper layers of the communication 67
chain include password protection and user admission control. 68
Physical-layer security, on the other hand, exploits the random- 69
ness of the noise and the wireless communication channel to 70
limit the amount of legitimate information to be detected by 71
unauthorized eavesdroppers [8], [9]. 72
Different from point-to-point communication, studying the 73
secrecy performance in a large-scale wireless network requires 74
not only the knowledge of locations of legitimate users but also 75
the knowledge of locations of eavesdropping users that may 76
interact with legitimate users. Initial works that characterize 77
the secrecy performance in multiuser wireless networks rely 78
on the secrecy graph model to study the node connectiv- 79
ity [10], [11] and the maximum secrecy rate [12], from 80
an information-theoretic perspective. Following these works, 81
the secrecy rate per source-destination pair was investigated 82
in [13] by characterizing the secrecy capacity scaling laws 83
in a wireless network. Moving from network information 84
theory, recent works have evaluated the secrecy performance 85
in multiuser wireless networks using mathematical tools from 86
stochastic geometry [14], [15]. It should be noted that works 87
in [8]–[15] are all focused on RF based wireless networks. 88
0733-8716 © 2017 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted,
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Different from RF communication, which is typically mod-89
eled as a Gaussian broadcast channel with an average power90
constraint at the transmitter side, VLC typically uses intensity91
modulation and direct detection (IM/DD) due to the use92
of inexpensive light-emitting diodes (LEDs) and photodi-93
odes (PDs) as the optical transmitter and receiver, respectively.94
In VLC, since the signal is modulated onto the intensity of95
the emitted light, it must satisfy average, peak as well as96
non-negative amplitude constraints, that are imposed by the97
dynamic range of typical LEDs and practical illumination98
requirements [6], [16]–[18]. Although typical LEDs have a99
nonlinear electrical-to-optical (E/O) transfer characteristic, this100
nonlinearity can be successfully compensated by pre-distortion101
techniques [19]. Also, since the wavelength of visible light is102
hundreds of nanometers while the detection area of a typical103
PD is millions of square wavelengths, this spatial diversity104
essentially prevents the “multipath fading” effect in the VLC105
channel. Due to these fundamental differences, results on the106
secrecy capacity obtained for RF networks can not be directly107
applied to VLC networks.108
Since the secrecy capacity is related to the information109
capacity of the communication channel [8], [9], before deter-110
mining the secrecy capacity in VLC networks it is essential111
to obtain the information capacity of the VLC channel with112
average, peak and non-negative constraints. However, to the113
best of authors’ knowledge, the exact information capacity of114
the VLC channel with such constraints still remains unknown,115
even for the simplest single-input single-output (SISO) case,116
despite some lower and upper bounds have been deri-117
ved [16]–[18]. By considering one transmitter, one legitimate118
user and one eavesdropper in a VLC system, lower and upper119
bounds on the secrecy capacity of the amplitude-constrained120
Gaussian wiretap channel was recently studied in [20], with121
the use of the derived capacity lower and upper bounds in [16].122
In the same work [20], beamforming was also utilized to123
improve the secrecy capacity for the multiple-input single-124
output (MISO) VLC channel. Following this, the optimal125
beamformer design problem subject to amplitude constraints126
was further studied in [21]. The secrecy performance in127
a single-cell VLC system with only one AP was studied128
in [22]. However, the randomness of legitimate users as well as129
eavesdroppers and, more importantly, the interactions between130
them, have not been fully characterized when analyzing the131
secrecy performance in a random multiuser VLC network.132
A. Approaches and Contributions133
In this work, we aim to characterize the secrecy performance134
in an indoor multiuser VLC network by considering the135
unique properties of the VLC channel as well as the network136
layout, that differ from typical RF networks. Our approach137
builds upon a proposed three-dimensional network model with138
two independent random topologies for the VLC APs and139
mobile users. Specifically, the VLC APs are modeled by a140
two-dimensional homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP)141
in the ceiling, while the locations of users, that include142
both legitimate users and eavesdroppers, are modeled by143
another independent two-dimensional homogeneous PPP at144
the user plane. To separate eavesdroppers from legitimate 145
users, the locations of random eavesdroppers are obtained 146
from a thinned PPP. Despite the grid-like deployment of LEDs 147
in typical offices, the following observations indicate that a 148
stochastic model may be required to accurately capture the 149
distribution of APs in a VLC network. First, more and more 150
LEDs with built-in motion-detection sensors are deployed in 151
public spaces in order to reduce energy consumption. In this 152
case, some of the LEDs will be temporally switched off when 153
they are not required to provide illumination. Second, the dis- 154
tribution of ceiling lights is not necessarily equivalent to the 155
distribution of APs in a VLC network because not necessarily 156
all of the ceiling lights are simultaneously operating in the 157
communication mode, i.e., some of the ceiling lights may 158
operate in the illumination mode only when no data traffic 159
is demanded from them. In these scenarios, the distribution 160
of APs can not be accurately modeled by the grid model. 161
Instead, a stochastic thinning process built upon the grid- 162
like deployment of LEDs is more accurate, where the active- 163
ness/idleness of each AP is determined by a time-varying 164
probability distribution function (PDF). However, finding the 165
PDF of activeness/idleness of the LED requires full knowledge 166
of the users’ movement and handover characteristics, which is 167
generally complicated and not analytically tractable. In order 168
to derive analytically tractable results, the PPP model is 169
assumed in this work. For completeness, we also compare 170
the secrecy performance between the PPP model and the grid 171
model and provide a method of applying the derived analytical 172
results to estimate the secrecy performance in a conventional 173
grid-like VLC network. 174
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 175
1) When the legitimate user is served by the nearest AP 176
in its vicinity, we derive the distribution function of the 177
secrecy rate of a typical legitimate user, based on which 178
secrecy outage probability and ergodic secrecy rate are 179
obtained. To provide further insights into the secrecy 180
performance with different network parameters, lower 181
and upper bounds on the secrecy outage probability as 182
well as on the ergodic secrecy rate are given. 183
2) We enhance the secrecy performance by implementing 184
AP cooperation in a multiuser VLC network, and give 185
lower and upper bounds on the secrecy outage probabil- 186
ity and the ergodic secrecy rate. The derived analytical 187
bounds are found to be reasonably tight in general 188
and become tighter when the density of eavesdroppers 189
becomes larger. 190
3) To further enhance the secrecy performance for legiti- 191
mate users, we introduce a disk-shaped secrecy protected 192
zone around the AP in a multiuser VLC network, 193
in which the presence of eavesdroppers is prohibited. 194
In this scenario, the secrecy outage probability and the 195
ergodic secrecy rate are derived. The impact of designing 196
the protected zone with different sizes on the secrecy 197
performance is also investigated. 198
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 199
In Section II, we introduce a three-dimensional link 200
model for multiuser VLC networks and formulate the 201
information-theoretic secrecy rate expression based on a close 202
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approximation of the channel capacity. The secrecy outage203
probability and the ergodic secrecy rate with/without the AP204
cooperation are derived in Section III. We extend the analysis205
on the secrecy performance in Section IV by implementing a206
disk-shaped protected zone. Simulation results and discussions207
are provided in Section V. Finally, concluding remarks are208
given in Section VI.209
II. SYSTEM MODEL210
A. Poisson Network Model211
We consider a downlink transmission scenario of a multiuser212
VLC network with the presence of both legitimate users and213
eavesdroppers inside a three-dimensional space. The VLC214
APs are vertically fixed, since they are attached to the room215
ceiling, and their horizontal positions are modeled by a216
two-dimensional homogeneous PPP a with density λa,217
in nodes per unit area. Similarly, mobile users are assumed to218
be at a fixed height and their horizontal positions are modeled219
by another independent two-dimensional homogeneous PPP220
u with density λu. The vertical distance between the AP221
plane and the user plane is denoted by L. After adding an222
additional user at the room center,1 the new point process223
for mobile users becomes u
⋃{0}. Slivnyak’s theorem states224
that adding a user into u is equivalent to conditioning u225
on the added point, and this process does not change the226
distribution of u [23]. Therefore, the added user at the origin227
can be treated as the typical legitimate user in the study228
since it can reflect the spatial average of the performance of229
all legitimate users in the network. Among all of the users,230
there exist malicious eavesdroppers that could compromise231
the transmission privacy of ongoing legitimate links, due to232
the broadcast nature of the VLC channel. Since eavesdroppers233
typically disguise as legitimate users, it is uncertain whether234
a random user u ∈ u is a legitimate user or an eavesdropper.235
Therefore, it is assumed that u is an eavesdropper with236
probability pe and that u is a legitimate user with probability237
1 − pe. This thinned realization of u gives the point process238
for eavesdroppers, e, which is also a homogeneous PPP239
whose density can be found as λe = peλu [23]. Furthermore,240
it is assumed that eavesdroppers do not collude with each other241
so that each eavesdropper needs to decode any confidential242
messages sent to legitimate users individually. An example of243
the described multiuser VLC network is depicted in Fig. 1.244
A complete VLC channel includes both the line-of-245
sight (LOS) link and non-line-of-sight (NLOS) links, that are246
caused by light reflections from interior surfaces. However,247
in a typical indoor lighting environment, the sum signal power248
carried by NLOS components is significantly weaker than that249
carried by the LOS link [1], [24], [25]. Therefore, we will250
only focus on the LOS link in the following analysis in251
order to obtain tractable analytical results. The VLC APs252
are assumed to have a Lambertian radiation profile whose253
Lambertian order is m = −1/ log2(cos (1/2)), where 1/2254
1The room center is also called the origin. We use both expressions inter-
changeably throughout the paper since the room center has more geographical
meanings while the origin has more mathematical meanings when we apply
stochastic geometry tools in the theoretical analysis.
Fig. 1. Random network model: the legitimate user of interest is placed at
the room center; VLC APs are randomly distributed in the ceiling according
to a homogeneous PPP a; and eavesdroppers are randomly distributed on the
same plane as the legitimate user, following a homogeneous PPP e. In this
example, an indoor VLC network of size 18 × 14 × 3.5 m3 is shown.
denotes the semi-angle of the LED. The PD equipped at each 255
user is assumed to be facing vertically upwards with a field-of- 256
view (FOV) of fov. For each VLC link, the optical channel 257
direct current (DC) gain is given by [26]: 258
h = (m + 1)Aη
2πd2
cosm(φ)T (ψ)g(ψ) cos(ψ), (1) 259
where A denotes the effective detection area of the PD; η 260
is the responsivity of the PD; φ and ψ are the angle of 261
irradiance and the angle of incidence of the optical link, 262
respectively; T (ψ) represents the gain of the optical filter used 263
at the receiver; and g(ψ) represents the gain of the optical 264
concentrator. The optical concentrator gain is given by [26]: 265
g(ψ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
n2
sin2(fov)
, 0 ≤ ψ ≤ fov
0, ψ > fov
, (2) 266
where n is the reflective index of the optical concentrator, and 267
it is defined as the ratio of the speed of light in vacuum and 268
the phase velocity of light in the optical material. For visible 269
light, the typical value for n varies between 1 and 2. 270
Consider the communication link from an AP x ∈ a to 271
an eavesdropper e ∈ e. Based on the geometry [7] of the 272
VLC link, it is easy to obtain d = √‖e − x‖2 + L2, cos(φ) = 273
L/
√‖e − x‖2 + L2 and cos(ψ) = L/√‖e − x‖2 + L2. 274
Therefore, the received optical power at eavesdropper e from 275
AP x can be written as: 276
Prx(x, e) = h Ptx 277
= (m + 1)AηT (ψ)g(ψ)L
m+1
2π(‖e − x‖2 + L2)m+32
Ptx, (3) 278
where Ptx denotes the transmit optical power of the AP. 279
Similarly, the received signal power at the legitimate user can 280
be written as Prx(x, o), where o representing the origin is the 281
location of the typical user of interest. 282
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B. Secrecy Capacity Formulation283
The classic Shannon equation does not apply to VLC284
because of the average, peak and non-negative constraints on285
the modulated optical signal. Although the exact capacity of286
the VLC channel remains unknown, several upper and lower287
bounds have been derived [16]–[18]. Based on the capacity288
lower bound derived in [16], the exact channel capacity of289
VLC can be written as:290
C = 1
2
log2
(
1 + exp(1)P
2
rx
2πσ 2n
)
+ 

(
Prx
σn
)
, (4)291
where 
, as a function of the received optical-signal-to-292
noise ratio (OSNR) Prx/σn, represents a positive capacity293
gap between the exact channel capacity and the analytical294
lower bound [16], and σ 2n represents the total power of noise295
processes at the receiver. Note that inside the receiver circuit296
the dominant noise sources are the thermal noise and shot297
noise [1], [25]. The thermal noise is mainly caused by the298
preamplifier circuits while the shot noise originates mainly299
from the ambient light and/or other light sources. The signal-300
dependent shot noise, on the other hand, is relatively small,301
and hence its effect can be ignored. The overall noise process302
is generally well modeled as the additive white Gaussian303
noise (AWGN) [1], [25]. As the legitimate user and eaves-304
droppers may use different grades of receivers, for example,305
PDs with different detection areas and/or bandwidths, they are306
subject to different levels of receiver noise and are capable of307
detecting signals with different amplifying gains. Without loss308
of generality, the choice of different grades of receivers can309
be accounted for in the system model by assigning different310
noise variances at the legitimate user and the eavesdropper.311
Based on this, we denote by σ 2nb and σ 2ne the noise variance at312
the legitimate user and the noise variance at the eavesdropper,313
respectively. Unlike RF channels whose input signals are314
subject to an average power constraint [29], VLC channels315
require the input signals to satisfy a peak amplitude (optical316
power) constraint. This makes it challenging to obtain closed-317
form expressions for the secrecy capacity of a VLC link,318
even for the simplest SISO case [20], [30]. Therefore, in the319
following analysis we focus on a tight achievable lower bound320
on the secrecy capacity [20]:321
Cs ≥ [Cb − Ce]+ = Cs, (5)322
where [a]+ = max{a, 0}; Cs represents the exact secrecy323
capacity; C s represents the tight lower bound on the secrecy324
capacity given by the right-hand side of (5); Cb is the channel325
capacity of the legitimate link; and Ce is the channel capacity326
of the eavesdropper’s link.327
III. SECRECY RATE IN RANDOM VLC NETWORKS328
A. Nearest AP to Serve the Legitimate User329
Without AP cooperation, the nearest AP is typically330
assumed to serve a mobile user in the VLC network in order to331
maximize the information rate of the communication link. As a332
result, based on (4), the capacity of the legitimate link can be333
written as Cb = maxx∈a 12 log2(1+exp(1)P2rx(x, o)/2πσ 2nb)+334

 (Prx(x, o)/σnb) = 12 log2(1 + exp(1)P2rx(x0, o)/2πσ 2nb) +335

 (Prx(x0, o)/σnb), where x0 represents the location of the336
nearest AP to the origin. Since it is assumed that eavesdroppers 337
do not collude, the secrecy performance of the legitimate 338
user is limited by the eavesdropper with the highest OSNR. 339
Therefore, the lower bound on the secrecy capacity at the 340
typical legitimate user is formulated as: 341
Cs =
[
1
2
log2
(
1 + exp(1)P
2
rx(x0, o)
2πσ 2nb
)
342
− 1
2
log2
(
1 + exp(1)P
2
rx(x0, e
∗(x0))
2πσ 2ne
)
343
+ 

(
Prx(x0, o)
σnb
)
− 

(
Prx(x0, e∗(x0))
σne
)]+
, (6) 344
where e∗(x0) denotes the horizontal distance from AP x0 to 345
the nearest eavesdropper. Given that the legitimate user is 346
connected to AP x , the general solution for e∗(x), denot- 347
ing the horizontal distance between AP x and the strongest 348
eavesdropper, can be obtained by finding the location of the 349
eavesdropper e ∈ e that receives the strongest signal power: 350
e∗(x) = arg max
e∈e
Prx(x, e) 351
= arg min
e∈e
‖e − x‖, (7) 352
where the last step is obtained based on the monotonic 353
property of (3). By utilizing fractional frequency reuse [28] 354
or orthogonal multiple access techniques, the achievable data 355
rate can be quantified through the received signal-to-noise 356
ratio (SNR) without the side effect of co-channel inter- 357
ference (CSI). As a result, OSNR of Prx/σn > 30 dB 358
can be achieved at typical illumination levels [25], [27], 359
where 
(Prx/σn) is found to be comparatively small [16]– 360
[18]. Therefore, we focus on the high OSNR regime, where 361

(Prx(x0, o)/σnb)  1/2 log2(exp(1)P2rx(x0, o)/2πσ 2nb) and 362

(Prx(x0, e∗(x0))/σne)  1/2 log2(exp(1)P2rx(x0, e∗(x0))/ 363
2πσ 2ne). Based on this, (6) can be further approximated to: 364
Cs ≈
[
1
2
log2
(
P2rx(x0, o)
P2rx(x0, e∗(x))
)
+log2
(
σne
σnb
)]+
= Rs. (8) 365
To distinguish from the exact secrecy capacity, we define in (8) 366
Rs as the achievable secrecy rate. Due to the lack of the com- 367
plete knowledge of the exact secrecy capacity Cs, the secrecy 368
rate Rs is of interest in this paper. It is shown in (8) that a non- 369
negative secrecy rate can only be achieved when the legitimate 370
user achieves a higher SNR than the strongest eavesdropper. 371
In the case that a eavesdropper receives signals from a less- 372
degraded link than the legitimate user, the achievable secrecy 373
rate drops to zero. It can also be seen from (8) that when 374
the legitimate user and the eavesdropper use different grades 375
of receivers, the achieved secrecy capacity at the legitimate 376
user is offset by a constant, whose value is proportional to the 377
logarithm of σne/σnb. Therefore, without loss of generality, 378
σnb = σne is assumed in the following analysis. 379
Theorem 1: When the legitimate user is served by the 380
nearest AP in its vicinity, the cummulative distribution func- 381
tion (CDF) of the secrecy rate Rs is given by: 382
FRs(v) = 1 −
1
1 + λeλa 4
v
m+3
exp
(
−πλe
(
4
v
m+3 − 1
)
L2
)
, (9) 383
where v ≥ 0. 384
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Proof: According to (8), we have Rs ≥ 0. Therefore,385
the CDF of the secrecy rate Rs can be calculated by:386
FRs (v) = P [Rs ≤ v]387
= P
[
P2rx(x0, o)
P2rx(x0, e∗(x0))
≤ 4v
]
388
= P
[
‖e∗(x0) − x0‖ ≤
√
βx20 + (β − 1)L2
]
, (10)389
where β = 4v/(m+3). Since the legitimate user is served by390
the nearest AP, the PDF of x0 is [31]:391
fx0(x0) = 2πλax0 exp
(
−πλax20
)
. (11)392
When conditioned on distance x0, (10) is the probability that393
no eavesdroppers exist within a circle, which is centered at394
x0 and has a radius of
√
βx20 + (β − 1)L2. Such probability395
can be calculated using the void probability of PPP [32]. As a396
result, (10) can be calculated as:397
FRs(v)398
= Ex0
[
P
[
‖e∗(x0) − x0‖ ≤
√
βx20 + (β − 1)L2
∣
∣
∣
∣ x0
]]
399
=
∫ ∞
0
P
[
‖e∗(x0)−x0‖ ≤
√
βx20 +(β−1)L2
∣
∣
∣
∣ x0
]
fx0(x0)dx0400
=
∫ ∞
0
(
1 − exp
(
−πλe
(
βx20 + (β − 1)L2
)))
2πλax0401
× exp
(
−πλax20
)
dx0402
= 1 − 1
1 + λeλa β
exp
(
−πλe (β − 1) L2
)
. (12)403
After plugging β = 4v/(m+3) into (12), we obtain (9).404
Corollary 1: When the legitimate user is served by the n-th405
nearest AP in its vicinity, the CDF of the secrecy rate is:406
FRs(v) = 1−
(
1
1 + λeλa 4
v
m+3
)n
exp
(
−πλe
(
4
v
m+3 − 1
)
L2
)
,407
(13)408
where v ≥ 0.409
Proof: The distance distribution of the legitimate user to410
the n-th nearest AP is given by [31]:411
fxn (xn) =
2(πλax2n)n
xn(n)
exp
(
−πλax2n
)
. (14)412
By using (14) and following similar steps as in (12), (13) can413
be obtained.414
The secrecy outage probability, denoted by pso, is defined415
as the probability that the secrecy rate is below a target secrecy416
rate R¯s. Mathematically, it is formulated as:417
pso = P
[
Rs ≤ R¯s
] = FRs (R¯s), (15)418
which can be obtained directly from Theorem 1.419
Corollary 2: When the legitimate user is served by the420
nearest AP in its vicinity, the secrecy outage probability is421
lower bounded by:422
pLBso = 1 − exp
(
−πλe
(
4
R¯s
m+3 − 1
)
L2
)
, (16)423
when the density of VLC APs approaches infinity.424
Proof: (16) can be obtained from pLBso = 425
limλa→∞ pso. 426
Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 provide an important guideline 427
for the design of VLC networks: installing more VLC APs 428
can help decrease the secrecy outage probability of a typical 429
legitimate user; however, when the density of APs reaches 430
a certain level, further increasing the density of APs is 431
not meaningful since it can no longer enhance the secrecy 432
performance. In other words, it is impossible for a legitimate 433
user in the network to simultaneously achieve a target secrecy 434
rate R¯s and have an outage probability lower than pLBso (R¯s). 435
Given a target secrecy rate R¯s and a target outage proba- 436
bility p¯so > pLBso (R¯s), this requirement can be achieved by 437
installing more APs in the network so that the density of 438
APs satisfies λa ≥ λe (1 − p¯so) 4R¯s/(m+3)
/(
p¯so − pLBso (R¯s)
)
. 439
From (9) and (16), it is shown that reducing the semi-angle 440
of the LED, or equivalently increasing the Lambertian order, 441
can also help improve the secrecy performance of the network. 442
Nevertheless, the actual choice of the semi-angle of the LED 443
should also satisfy the illumination requirement. 444
Theorem 2: When the legitimate user is served by the 445
nearest AP in its vicinity, the ergodic secrecy rate at the 446
legitimate user is: 447
E[Rs] = m + 3ln(4)
[
exp
(
π(λe + λa)L2
)
Ei
(
−π(λe + λa)L2
)
448
− exp
(
πλe L2
)
Ei
(
−πλe L2
) ]
, (17) 449
where Ei(a) = − ∫ ∞−a exp(−t)/tdt is the exponential integral 450
function [33]. 451
Proof: The ergodic secrecy rate can be calculated based 452
on the CDF of Rs: 453
E[Rs] =
∫ ∞
0
(
1 − FRs(v)
)
dv 454
= m+3
ln(4)
∫ ∞
1
1
β
(
1+ λeλa β
) exp
(
−πλe (β−1) L2
)
dβ 455
= m + 3
ln(4)
[ ∫ ∞
1
exp
(−πλe (β − 1) L2
)
β
dβ 456
−
∫ ∞
1
exp
(−πλe (β − 1) L2
)
β + λaλe
dβ
]
, (18) 457
where the integration variable has been changed from v to β. 458
After applying [33, eq. 3.351.5], the first integration in (18) 459
can be calculated as: 460
∫ ∞
1
exp
(−πλe (β−1) L2
)
β
dβ = − exp
(
πλe L2
)
Ei
(
−πλe L2
)
. 461
(19) 462
After applying [33, eq. 3.352.2], the second integration in (18) 463
can be calculated as: 464
∫ ∞
1
exp
(−πλe (β − 1) L2
)
β + λaλe
dβ 465
= − exp
(
π(λe+λa)L2
)
Ei
(
−π(λe+λa)L2
)
. (20) 466
After plugging (19) and (20) into (18), (17) is obtained. 467
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Corollary 3: When the legitimate user is served by the468
nearest AP in its vicinity, the ergodic secrecy rate at the469
legitimate user is upper bounded by:470
RUBs =
m + 3
ln(4)
(
− exp
(
πλe L2
)
Ei
(
−πλe L2
))
. (21)471
Proof: The upper bound on the secrecy rate can be472
obtained from RUBs = limλa→∞ E[Rs]. Based on the equality473
lim
λa→∞
exp
(
π(λe + λa)L2
)
Ei
(
−π(λe + λa)L2
)
= 0, (22)474
we obtain (21).475
Theorem 2 and Corollary 3 indicate that increasing the density476
of VLC APs can help enhance the ergodic secrecy rate of477
a typical legitimate user. However, when the density of APs478
exceeds a certain level, installing more APs can not enhance479
the ergodic secrecy rate any further. While satisfying the480
illumination requirement, using LEDs with a smaller semi-481
angle can increase the ergodic secrecy rate of a typical user.482
Specifically, it can be seen from (17) and (21) that a linear483
relationship exists between the ergodic secrecy rate and the484
Lambertian order m. Given the choice of LEDs, the maximum485
ergodic secrecy rate can not exceed the upper bound given486
in (21). To achieve a target ergodic secrecy rate R¯s, whose487
value is smaller than RUBs , the density of APs needs to488
exceed λ∗a , where λ∗a is the numerical solution for λa to equa-489
tion exp
(
π (λe + λa)L2
)
Ei
(−π (λe + λa)L2
) = ln(4)R¯s/490
(m + 3) + exp (πλe L2
)
Ei
(−πλe L2
)
.491
B. Optimal AP to Serve the Legitimate User492
Due to the randomness of eavesdroppers, it is not always493
optimal to serve the legitimate user with the nearest AP. For494
example, if the eavesdropper is close to the nearest AP around495
the legitimate user but far away from the second nearest496
AP around the legitimate user, selecting the second nearest497
AP to serve the legitimate user may yield a higher secrecy498
rate. Therefore, with the cooperation among APs, the secrecy499
performance at legitimate users can be further enhanced.500
However, it should be noted that selecting the optimal AP to501
serve legitimate users requires the knowledge of the location502
information of all eavesdroppers at the central controller,503
which can be achieved with indoor sensing and localization504
technologies. Despite the additional implementation and com-505
putation complexity, this optimal scheme yields an enhanced506
secrecy rate, which is useful for network designers to quantify507
the secrecy performance provided by the nearest AP and508
optimal AP and to decide which scheme is more suitable for509
practical implementations. When the optimal AP is selected510
to serve the legitimate user, the secrecy rate is formulated as:511
Rs =
[
max
x∈a
{
1
2
log2
(
P2rx(x, o)
P2rx(x, e∗(x))
)}]+
. (23)512
Due to the intractability of the secrecy rate expression given513
in (23), the distribution function of Rs is hard to obtain. In the514
following, we provide two analytical bounds on the CDF of515
the secrecy rate.516
Corollary 4: With the cooperation among VLC APs, 517
the CDF of the secrecy rate at the typical legitimate user is 518
lower bounded by: 519
FRs(v) ≥ exp
(
−λa
λe
4−
v
m+3 exp
(
−πλe
(
4
v
m+3 − 1
)
L2
))
, 520
(24) 521
and is upper bounded by: 522
FRs(v) ≤ 1−
1
1 + λeλa 4
v
m+3
exp
(
−πλe
(
4
v
m+3 − 1
)
L2
)
. (25) 523
Proof: With the cooperation of VLC APs, the CDF of the 524
secrecy rate can be calculated with the help of the probability 525
generating functional (PGFL) of the PPP [23]: 526
FRs(v) 527
= P
[
max
x∈a
{
1
2
log2
(
P2rx(x, o)
P2rx(x, e∗(x))
)}
≤ v
]
528
= P
[
1
2
log2
(
P2rx(x, o)
P2rx(x, e∗(x))
)
≤ v,∀x ∈ a
]
529
= Ee
⎡
⎣Ea
⎡
⎣
∏
x∈a
1
(
‖e − x‖ ≤
√
βl2 + (β − 1)L2
)
⎤
⎦
⎤
⎦ 530
= Ee
[
exp
[
−λa
∫
R2
1
[
‖e−x‖ >
√
βl2+(β−1)L2
∣
∣
∣
∣ x
]
dx
]]
, 531
(26) 532
where 1(A) = 1 with event A being true, and zero otherwise. 533
Based on Jensen’s inequality, the lower bound can be calcu- 534
lated as: 535
FRs (v) ≥ exp
[
−2πλa
∫ ∞
0
P
[
‖e−x‖ >
√
βx2+(β−1)L2
∣
∣
∣
∣ x
]
536
× xdx0
]
. (27) 537
After calculating the integration part in (27), the lower bound 538
result in Corollary 4 is obtained. The upper bound can be 539
obtained straightforwardly from the following inequality: 540
[
max
x∈a
{
log2
(
P2rx(x, o)
P2rx(x, e∗(x))
)}]+
≥
[
log2
(
P2rx(x0, o)
P2rx(x0, e∗(x0))
)]+
. 541
(28) 542
In other words, choosing the nearest AP to serve the legitimate 543
user is sub-optimal, which gives an upper bound on the CDF 544
of the secrecy capacity. Therefore, the upper bound expression 545
shown in (25) can be obtained directly from Theorem 1. 546
Based on the upper bound on the CDF of the secrecy rate, 547
a lower bound on the ergodic secrecy rate can be obtained, 548
as given in (17). An upper bound on the ergodic secrecy 549
rate can be obtained by integrating the complement of the 550
CDF of Rs: 551
E[Rs] 552
=
∫ ∞
0
(
1 − FRs(v)
)
dv 553
≤ m+3
ln(4)
∫ ∞
1
(
1−exp
(
− λa
λeβ
exp
(
−πλe (β−1) L2
))) 1
β
dβ. 554
(29) 555
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Fig. 2. Random network model with a secrecy protected zone. In this model,
each VLC AP has a disk-shaped protected zone, which is centered around the
AP and has a radius of D on the user plane. For simplicity, only the protected
zone around the nearest AP is drawn.
Because of the nested exponential function in (29), a closed-556
form expression is not available. However, (29) can be557
efficiently calculated using numerical methods.558
IV. ENHANCING SECRECY RATE IN VLC559
NETWORKS WITH A PROTECTED ZONE560
In order to further enhance the secrecy performance of561
legitimate users in VLC networks, a strategy named the “pro-562
tected zone” [34] can be implemented. As depicted in Fig. 2,563
a protected zone is an eavesdropper-free area (on the user564
plane), which allows only legitimate users to enter. If any565
eavesdropper enters the protected zone, such behavior will be566
made aware to the AP, and the AP will notify the legitimate567
user and temporarily stop the communication. A practical568
implementation of the protected zone in VLC networks can be569
achieved with motion sensors that are already built in modern570
energy-efficient lighting devices. We acknowledge that there571
might be means to break the suggested enforcement of the572
protected zone. However, a deeper investigation of this aspect573
is outside the scope of this work. A secrecy protected zone574
can be completely described by its center, i.e., its associated575
AP, and a security radius D. The security radius is defined576
as the smallest horizontal distance between the AP and any577
eavesdroppers that are undetectable.578
Lemma 1: Given that the horizontal distance between the579
nearest AP to the legitimate user is x0, the PDF of the hori-580
zontal distance between this AP and the nearest eavesdropper,581
that is outside the protected zone, is:582
f‖e∗(x0)−x0‖(α) = 2πλeα exp
(
−πλe(α2 − D2)
)
, (30)583
for α ≥ D, and zero otherwise.584
Proof: (30) can be obtained using the void probability of585
PPP [32].586
With Lemma 1, we are ready to obtain the CDF of the587
secrecy rate enhanced by the protected zone.588
Corollary 5: When the legitimate user is served by the 589
nearest AP in its vicinity, which has a protected zone with 590
radius D, the CDF of the enhanced secrecy rate is given by: 591
FRs (v) = 1 −
exp
(
−πλe
((
4
v
m+3 − 1
)
L2 − D2
))
1 + λeλa 4
v
m+3
, (31) 592
for v ≥ m+32 log2
(
D2/L2 + 1), and 593
FRs (v) =
exp
(
−πλa
(
D2 −
(
4
v
m+3 −1
)
L2
)
4−
v
m+3
)
1 + λaλe 4−
v
m+3
, (32) 594
for 0 ≤ v < m+32 log2
(
D2/L2 + 1). 595
Proof: Since the protected zone has a radius D, the min- 596
imum distance between the nearest eavesdropper and the AP 597
is D. Therefore, 598
e∗(x0) = arg min
e∈e,e/∈B(x0,D)
‖e − x0‖, (33) 599
where B(x0, D) denotes the disk-shaped area centered at x0 600
with radius D. Due to the exclusive region in (33), the deriva- 601
tion of the CDF of the enhanced secrecy rate needs to be 602
separated into two scenarios. First, when
√
(β − 1)L2 ≥ D, 603
i.e., v ≥ m+32 log2
(
D2/L2 + 1), the CDF of the enhanced 604
secrecy rate can be calculated as: 605
FRs (v) =
∫ ∞
0
(
1 − exp
(
−πλe
(
βx20 + (β − 1)L2 − D2
)))
606
×2πλax0 exp
(
−πλax20
)
dx0, (34) 607
which gives the result in (31). Second, when
√
(β − 1)L2 < 608
D, i.e., 0 ≤ v < m+32 log2
(
D2/L2 + 1), the CDF of the 609
enhanced secrecy rate can be calculated as: 610
FRs (v) =
∫ ∞
√
D2−(β−1)L2
β
2πλax0 exp
(
−πλax20
)
611
×
(
1 − exp
(
−πλe
(
βx20 + (β − 1)L2 − D2
)))
dx0 612
+
∫
√
D2−(β−1)L2
β
0
2πλax0 exp
(
−πλax20
)
613
× P [e∗(x0) ∈ B(x0, D)
]
dx0, (35) 614
in which the critical point x0 =
√
(D2 − (β − 1)L2)/β is 615
found by solving
√
βx20 + (β − 1)L2 = D. Since e∗(x0) /∈ 616
B(x0, D), P
[
e∗(x0) ∈ B(x0, D)
] = 0, and the second inte- 617
gration in (35) reduces to zero. After calculating the first 618
integration in (35), we obtain (32). To this end, the proof is 619
completed. 620
It can be seen from Corollary 5 that the radius of the 621
protected zone has a strong impact on the CDF of the secrecy 622
rate and on the secrecy outage probability. On the one hand, 623
if the radius of the protected zone is small enough so that the 624
target secrecy rate satisfies R¯s ≥ m+32 log2
(
D2/L2 + 1), given 625
a fixed density of eavesdroppers, the secrecy outage probability 626
is lower bounded by: 627
pLBso = 1 − exp
(
−πλe
((
4
R¯s
m+3 − 1
)
L2 − D2
))
, (36) 628
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which is obtained when the density of the APs goes to629
infinity. On the other hand, if the radius of the protected630
zone is large enough so that the target secrecy rate satisfies631
R¯s < m+32 log2
(
D2/L2 + 1), increasing the density of VLC632
APs can efficiently reduce the secrecy outage probability, and633
the worst-case scenario of the secrecy outage probability is634
upper bounded by:635
pUBso = exp
(
−πλa
(
D2 −
(
4
R¯s
m+3 − 1
)
L2
)
4−
R¯s
m+3
)
, (37)636
which is obtained by letting λe approach infinity.637
Corollary 5 provides an essential guideline to network638
designers so that they can design a suitable protected zone639
around each VLC AP in order to provide legitimate users640
with guaranteed secrecy service. Specifically, for legitimate641
users to achieve a target secrecy rate R¯s with a target642
secrecy outage probability p¯so, network designers can set up643
the protected zone with radius no smaller than D∗, where644
D∗ = ((4R¯s/(m+3) − 1)L2 + (ln(1 − p¯so) + ln(1 + 4R¯s/(m+3)645
λe/λa))/πλe)
1/2 for p¯so ≥ 1 − (1 + 4R¯s/(m+3)λe/λa)−1,646
and D∗ = ((4R¯s/(m+3) − 1)L2 − (ln p¯so + ln(1 +647
4−R¯s/(m+3)λa/λe))4R¯s/(m+3)/πλa)1/2 for p¯so < 1 − (1 +648
4R¯s/(m+3)λe/λa)−1. Also, it is evident that a more stringent649
secrecy requirement with a larger R¯s and/or a smaller p¯so650
requires the implementation of a larger secrecy protected zone.651
Theorem 3: When the legitimate user is served by the652
nearest AP in its vicinity, which has a protected zone with653
radius D, the enhanced ergodic secrecy rate at the typical654
legitimate user is:655
E[Rs]656
= m + 3
ln(4)
[
− exp
(
πλe
(
L2 + D2
))
Ei
(
−πλe
(
L2 + D2
))
657
+ ln
(
D2
L2
+ 1
)]
+ m + 3
ln(4)
exp
(
πλa L2
) [
Ei
(
−πλa L2
)
658
+ exp
(
πλe
(
L2 + D2
))
Ei
(
−π(λa + λe)
(
L2 + D2
))
659
− Ei
(
−πλa
(
L2 + D2
)) ]
. (38)660
Proof: Based on Corollary 5, the enhanced ergodic rate661
can be calculated by integrating the complement of the CDF.662
Since the CDF has different expressions at different regions,663
the integration should be separated into two parts:664
E[Rs]665
= m + 3
ln(4)
∫ D2
L2
+1
1
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝1 −
exp
(
−πλa
(
D2−(β−1)L2)
β
)
1 + λaλe 1β
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠
1
β
dβ666
+ m + 3
ln(4)
∫ ∞
D2
L2
+1
exp
(−πλe
(
(β−1) L2−D2))
β+ λeλa β2
dβ, (39)667
where for simplicity the variable of integration has been668
changed from v to β. The first integration in (39) can be669
simplified to: 670
∫ D2
L2
+1
1
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝1 −
exp
(
−πλa
(
D2−(β−1)L2)
β
)
1 + λaλe 1β
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠
1
β
dβ 671
= ln
(
D2
L2
+ 1
)
+ exp
(
πλa L2
)
672
×
∫ D2
L2
+1
1
exp
(
−πλa
(
L2+D2)
β
)
β + λaλe
dβ, (40) 673
in which the integration part can be obtained as: 674
∫ D2
L2
+1
1
exp
(
−πλa
(
L2+D2)
β
)
β + λaλe
dβ 675
= Ei
(
−πλa L2
)
− Ei
(
−πλa
(
L2 + D2
))
676
+ exp
(
πλe
(
L2 + D2
))
Ei
(
−π(λa + λe)
(
L2+D2
))
677
− exp
(
πλe
(
L2+D2
))
Ei
(
−πλa L2 − πλe
(
L2+D2
))
. 678
(41) 679
Similarly, the second integration in (39) can be simplified to: 680
∫ ∞
D2
L2
+1
exp
(−πλe
(
(β − 1) L2 − D2))
β + λeλa β2
dβ 681
= exp
(
πλe
(
L2 + D2
)) [ ∫ ∞
D2
L2
+1
exp
(−πλeβL2
)
β
dβ 682
−
∫ ∞
D2
L2
+1
exp
(−πλeβL2
)
β + λaλe
dβ
]
. (42) 683
Applying [33, eq. 3.352.2], the two integrations in (42) can 684
be calculated as: 685
∫ ∞
D2
L2
+1
exp
(−πλeβL2
)
β
dβ = −Ei
(
−πλe
(
L2+D2
))
, (43) 686
and 687
∫ ∞
D2
L2
+1
exp
(−πλeβL2
)
β + λaλe
dβ 688
= − exp
(
πλa L2
)
Ei
(
−πλe L2
(
λa
λe
+ D
2
L2
+1
))
. (44) 689
Combining (40) – (44) gives the result shown in (38), which 690
completes the proof. 691
Note that the expression for the ergodic secrecy rate 692
in Theorem 3 can be simplified to the one given in Theorem 2 693
when D = 0. Also, it is shown in Theorem 3 that the ergodic 694
secrecy rate scales linearly with the Lambertian order m, 695
regardless of the size of the protected zone. Given the choice 696
of LEDs, the density of APs and the density of eavesdroppers, 697
a target ergodic secrecy capacity R¯s can be achieved through 698
the implementation of a protected zone with radius D∗, where 699
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TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
D∗ is the numerical solution for D by letting (38) equal R¯s.700
Since the expression in (38) monotonically increases with701
respect to D, the numerical solution for D∗ is unique.702
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS703
A. Results Based on the PPP Model704
In this section, we use a MATLAB implementation to705
validate the derived results. Simulation results are obtained706
by averaging 20, 000 realizations of Monte Carlo simulations.707
A typical office of size 18 × 14 × 3.5 m3 is considered,708
as illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2. If not otherwise specified,709
the network parameters used for the simulation setup are710
described in Table I.711
First, we consider the scenario where the legitimate user is712
served by the nearest AP in its vicinity, without the imple-713
mentation of the secrecy protected zone. Therefore, malicious714
eavesdroppers can be horizontally as close as possible to the715
AP that serves the legitimate user. By fixing the density of716
eavesdroppers (λe = 0.2), the secrecy outage probability at717
the typical legitimate user is evaluated at different values of718
the AP density, as shown in Fig. 3. It can be seen that,719
when λa is small, increasing the density of VLC APs can720
efficiently reduce the secrecy outage probability at the legiti-721
mate user. However, when λa is large, further increasing the722
density of VLC APs only slightly reduces the secrecy outage723
probability. For example, given that the target secrecy rate is724
R¯s = 1 bit/s/Hz, increasing λa from 0.1 to 1 can cause the725
secrecy outage probability to drop by 0.3. In comparison, when726
λa is increased from 1 to 10, the secrecy outage probability727
only drops by 0.1. Also, it is shown that a lower bound on728
the secrecy outage probability exists even if the density of729
VLC APs approaches infinity. This result is in agreement730
with Corollary 2. In Fig. 4, the ergodic secrecy rate is plotted731
against the density of APs. It is shown that the ergodic secrecy732
rate at the legitimate user drops when the density of eaves-733
droppers increases. Given a fixed density of eavesdroppers,734
increasing the density of VLC APs can efficiently enhance the735
ergodic secrecy rate when λa is small. However, the ergodic736
secrecy rate of the legitimate user tends to saturate at high737
AP densities. As a result, increasing the density of VLC APs738
when λa is large does not bring a significant incrementation739
to the ergodic secrecy rate. Instead, increasing the density of740
APs when λa is small is more meaningful.741
Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability versus VLC AP density. The legitimate
user is served by the nearest AP in its vicinity. λe = 0.2.
Fig. 4. Ergodic secrecy rate versus VLC AP density. The legitimate user is
served by the nearest AP in its vicinity.
Second, we consider the scenario where the legitimate user 742
is served by the optimal AP when APs are cooperated in the 743
network. For the typical legitimate user, the optimal AP is 744
not necessarily the nearest one, depending on the locations 745
of potential eavesdroppers. With the cooperation among VLC 746
APs, the optimal AP that brings the highest secrecy rate to 747
the legitimate user is selected. For Monte Carlo simulations, 748
the optimal AP is found out through the exhaustive search 749
method. In Fig. 5, the secrecy outage probability is plotted 750
against different eavesdropper densities, and it can be seen 751
that the simulation results are well bounded by the derived 752
analytical results. On the one hand, by assuming that the 753
optimal AP is the nearest one, we underestimate the secrecy 754
rate at the legitimate user. As a result, this assumption leads to 755
an upper bound on the secrecy outage probability. On the other 756
hand, the lower bound on the secrecy outage probability is 757
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Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probability versus eavesdropper density. The legiti-
mate user is served by the optimal AP. R¯s = 0.5 bit/s/Hz.
Fig. 6. Ergodic secrecy rate versus eavesdropper density. The legitimate user
is served by the optimal AP.
obtained from Jensen’s inequality, as described in Corollary 4.758
Comparing the lower bound with the upper bound, it can be759
seen that the lower bound is closer to the simulation results.760
It is also shown in Fig. 5 that both theoretical bounds on761
the secrecy outage probability are reasonably tight when the762
eavesdropper density is large. In Fig. 6, the ergodic secrecy763
rate at the legitimate user is computed for different values of764
the eavesdropper density. It should be noted that assuming the765
optimal AP is the nearest one gives the lower bound on the766
ergodic secrecy rate in Fig. 6, which corresponds to the upper767
bound on the secrecy outage probability in Fig. 5. Again, both768
analytical bounds become tighter as the eavesdropper density769
increases. Based on the results shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6,770
we can conclude that the optimal AP that maximizes the771
secrecy performance at the legitimate user is not necessarily772
the nearest one. To investigate deeper, we show in Fig. 7773
Fig. 7. Probability mass function (PMF) of the index of the optimal AP.
λe = 0.2.
the probability mass function (PMF) of the index of the 774
optimal AP that maximizes the secrecy rate at the legitimate 775
user. Index i relates to the i -th nearest neighboring AP to 776
the legitimate user. For example, index 1 corresponds to the 777
nearest AP, index 2 corresponds to the second nearest AP, and 778
so on. It is shown in Fig. 7 that, compared to other neighboring 779
APs, the nearest AP is most likely the optimal one. However, 780
it is also possible that the optimal AP is the second nearest, 781
third nearest, etc. Fig. 7 also shows that with a smaller value 782
of λa, it is more likely that the nearest AP is the optimal one, 783
which therefore explains why the analytical bounds are tighter 784
for smaller values of λa, as observed in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. 785
Third, we consider the scenario where the legitimate user 786
is served by the nearest AP in its vicinity, with the imple- 787
mentation of a secrecy protected zone. It is assumed that any 788
malicious eavesdroppers that are inside the protected zone can 789
be detected by the AP so that these eavesdroppers do not cause 790
any secrecy information loss at the legitimate user. As a result, 791
the secrecy information loss at the legitimate user is caused 792
by the eavesdroppers that are outside the protected zone only. 793
In Fig. 8, the secrecy outage probability is plotted against the 794
density of VLC APs. It is shown that, for a given target secrecy 795
rate, the secrecy outage probability decreases as the AP density 796
increases. However, when λa is large, further increasing the 797
density of VLC APs only slightly reduces the secrecy outage 798
probability. Also, it is shown that there exists a lower bound 799
on the secrecy outage probability when λa approaches infinity. 800
After implementing a secrecy protected zone with radius D, 801
the secrecy outage probability is reduced significantly. More 802
specifically, when λa = 1, λe = 0.2 and the target secrecy rate 803
is R¯s = 2 bit/s/Hz, implementing a secrecy protected zone 804
with radius D = 1 m reduces the secrecy outage probability 805
by 0.2. If the secrecy protected zone has a radius of D = 2 m, 806
the secrecy outage probability can be reduced to nearly zero. 807
It is also shown in Fig. 8 that, with a sufficiently large 808
protected area, the secrecy outage probability is no longer 809
bounded at the lower end, i.e., increasing the density of VLC 810
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Fig. 8. Secrecy outage probability versus VLC AP density. The legitimate
user is served by the nearest AP in its vicinity, and eavesdroppers are outside
the protected zone with radius D. λe = 0.2.
Fig. 9. Secrecy outage probability versus eavesdropper density. The legiti-
mate user is served by the nearest AP in its vicinity, and eavesdroppers are
outside the protected zone with radius D. λa = 0.5.
APs can efficiently reduce the secrecy outage probability to811
zero. In Fig. 9, we fix λa = 0.5 and evaluate the impact of812
the eavesdropper density on the secrecy outage probability.813
It can be seen that, without the protected zone, the secrecy814
outage probability can be as large as one if the eavesdropper815
density is sufficiently high. However, with the implementation816
of a protected zone, the worst-case scenario of the secrecy817
outage probability can be limited below a certain level. For818
example, when the target secrecy rate is R¯s = 2 bit/s/Hz and819
the protected zone has a radius of D = 2 m, the worst-case820
secrecy outage probability at the legitimate user does not821
exceed 0.12, regardless of the eavesdropper density. To fur-822
ther investigate the impact of the protected zone, we show823
in Fig. 10 the ergodic secrecy rate against the radius of824
the protected zone while fixing the eavesdropper density to825
λe = 0.2. The slope of the curve shows that a very small826
protected area brings only marginal improvement on the827
Fig. 10. Ergodic secrecy rate versus the radius of the protected zone. The
legitimate user is served by the nearest AP in its vicinity. λe = 0.2.
secrecy performance. However, by increasing the size of 828
the protected zone further, the secrecy performance at the 829
legitimate user can be enhanced significantly. Specifically, 830
when λa = 1 and 1/2 = 30◦, increasing the radius of the 831
protected zone from 0 to 1 m increases the ergodic secrecy 832
rate by 0.6 bit/s/Hz. In contrast, increasing the radius of 833
the protected zone from 1 to 2 m can increase the ergodic 834
secrecy rate by 1.9 bit/s/Hz. In Fig. 10, it is also shown that 835
using more directional LEDs, i.e., LEDs with a smaller semi- 836
angle, enhances the secrecy performance at the legitimate user. 837
However, the actual choice of LEDs should also take practical 838
illumination requirements into consideration. 839
B. PPP Model vs. Grid Model 840
In the following, we compare the secrecy performance 841
between the stochastic PPP model and the deterministic grid 842
model. For the grid model, it implicitly assumes that the 843
number of APs, as well as their locations in the network, are 844
fixed and known. As shown in Fig. 11 and Fig. 12, we use a 845
hexagonal-shaped grid to model the locations of APs within 846
the same indoor space. A total number of 31 APs (represented 847
by red triangles) are considered, and without loss of generality 848
the secrecy performance is studied by focusing on the central 849
hexagonal cell. A legitimate user (represented by the green 850
circle) is randomly distributed within the central cell and is 851
served by the central AP. The eavesdroppers (represented by 852
blue squares) are assumed to follow a Poisson distribution 853
with intensity λe. To allow for a fair comparison between 854
the PPP model and the grid model, the density of APs in 855
the PPP model is set to 0.12 so that the expected number 856
of APs in the PPP model equals the total number of APs 857
in the grid model. It can be seen from Fig. 11 that the 858
PPP model and the grid model yield similar results for the 859
secrecy outage probability. Both curves have similar shapes 860
and trends, especially for higher target secrecy rates and 861
with larger eavesdropper densities. In general, the grid model 862
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Fig. 11. Secrecy outage probability comparison between the PPP model and
the grid model. λa = 0.12.
Fig. 12. Ergodic secrecy rate comparison between the PPP model and the
grid model. λa = 0.12.
provides slightly superior coverage performance than the PPP863
model because of its more regularized cell shapes. With the864
implementation of a secrecy protected zone, we compare865
in Fig. 12 the achieved ergodic secrecy rate between the PPP866
model and the grid model. The configuration of the grid model867
in Fig. 12 is the same as that in Fig. 11, except that the868
eavesdroppers are prohibited in the circular protected zone869
centered around the central AP. Results show that both models870
yield close ergodic secrecy rates, especially for networks with871
more populated eavesdroppers.872
VI. CONCLUSION873
In this work, we studied the performance of physical-layer874
secrecy in a three-dimensional multiuser VLC network. With875
the use of mathematical tools from stochastic geometry, analyt-876
ical expressions for the secrecy outage probability, the ergodic877
secrecy rate, as well as their lower and upper bounds, are878
derived in tractable forms and verified through Monte Carlo 879
simulations. Impacts of AP cooperation and the implementa- 880
tion of a secrecy protected zone on the secrecy performance 881
have also been investigated. Results show that cooperating 882
neighboring APs can enhance the secrecy performance of VLC 883
networks, but only to a limited extent. We also show that 884
building a secrecy protected zone around the AP significantly 885
improves the network secrecy performance. 886
Justifying the application of the PPP model to the perfor- 887
mance analysis of VLC networks is an important research 888
direction. Also, improved stochastic models may be developed 889
in the future to more accurately capture the spatial distribution 890
of APs in a real network deployment. 891
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Physical-Layer Security in Multiuser Visible
Light Communication Networks
Liang Yin and Harald Haas, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract— In this paper, we study the physical-layer security in1
a 3-D multiuser visible light communication (VLC) network. The2
locations of access points (APs) and mobile users are modeled as3
two 2-D, independent and homogeneous Poisson point processes4
at distinct heights. Using mathematical tools from stochastic5
geometry, we provide a new analytical framework to charac-6
terize the secrecy performance in multiuser VLC networks.7
Closed-form results for the outage probability and the ergodic8
secrecy rate are derived for networks without AP cooperation.9
Considering the cooperation among APs, we give tight lower10
and upper bounds on the secrecy outage probability and the11
ergodic secrecy rate. To further enhance the secrecy performance12
at the legitimate user, a disk-shaped secrecy protected zone is13
implemented in the vicinity of the transmit AP. Based on the14
obtained results, it is shown that cooperating neighboring APs15
in a multiuser VLC network can bring performance gains on16
the secrecy rate, but only to a limited extent. We also show17
that building an eavesdropper-free protected zone around the18
AP significantly improves the secrecy performance of legitimate19
users, which appears to be a promising solution for the design20
of multiuser VLC networks with high security requirements.21
Index Terms— Visible light communication, secrecy capacity,22
physical-layer security, poisson point process, stochastic23
geometry.24
I. INTRODUCTION25
BY UTILIZING the existing lighting infrastructure and26 shifting the communication frequency to the visible spec-27
trum, visible light communication (VLC) [1]–[3] has recently28
emerged as a promising candidate for future high-speed broad-29
band communications, which could effectively alleviate the30
spectrum congestion issue in current radio frequency (RF)31
based wireless systems. Recent advances have also led to the32
standardization of short-range wireless optical communication33
using VLC for local and metropolitan area networks [4],34
which serves as a major step towards its commercialization35
in the near future. Compared to RF communication, VLC36
has the following main advantages: 1) VLC builds upon37
existing lighting devices and operates on the license-free38
spectrum so that it has lower implementation cost; 2) VLC can39
operate safely in electromagnetic sensitive areas, where RF is40
intrinsically prohibited; 3) VLC networking can be designed in41
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addition to existing heterogeneous wireless networks because 42
it receives zero interference from, and adds zero interference to 43
its RF counterparts; 4) Based on the property that visible light 44
does not penetrate through opaque objects, the communication 45
bandwidth in one room can be efficiently reused in other rooms 46
to obtain a high frequency reuse factor and hence a high area 47
spectral efficiency; 5) Indoor VLC typically achieves higher 48
physical-layer security since the transmitted signal is confined 49
within the room. 50
The broadcast property of VLC has been utilized in many 51
novel designs of multiuser VLC networks [5]–[7]. However, 52
it also causes potential concerns to legitimate users and 53
network administrators regarding the information privacy and 54
confidentiality, especially in public areas, such as train sta- 55
tions and libraries. From an information-theoretic point of 56
view, the physical-layer security was pioneered by Wyner for 57
proposing the wiretap channel [8]: a channel in which an 58
eavesdropper receives a degraded version of the transmitted 59
signal. The degraded wiretap channel was later extended to 60
the non-degraded broadcast channel by Csiszár and Körner [9]. 61
In their seminal work, it is shown that perfect secrecy can be 62
achieved as long as the legitimate user has a less degraded 63
channel than the eavesdropper, and the secrecy capacity is 64
derived as the difference between the information capacity 65
for the two users. Typical security enhancement techniques 66
that are implemented at upper layers of the communication 67
chain include password protection and user admission control. 68
Physical-layer security, on the other hand, exploits the random- 69
ness of the noise and the wireless communication channel to 70
limit the amount of legitimate information to be detected by 71
unauthorized eavesdroppers [8], [9]. 72
Different from point-to-point communication, studying the 73
secrecy performance in a large-scale wireless network requires 74
not only the knowledge of locations of legitimate users but also 75
the knowledge of locations of eavesdropping users that may 76
interact with legitimate users. Initial works that characterize 77
the secrecy performance in multiuser wireless networks rely 78
on the secrecy graph model to study the node connectiv- 79
ity [10], [11] and the maximum secrecy rate [12], from 80
an information-theoretic perspective. Following these works, 81
the secrecy rate per source-destination pair was investigated 82
in [13] by characterizing the secrecy capacity scaling laws 83
in a wireless network. Moving from network information 84
theory, recent works have evaluated the secrecy performance 85
in multiuser wireless networks using mathematical tools from 86
stochastic geometry [14], [15]. It should be noted that works 87
in [8]–[15] are all focused on RF based wireless networks. 88
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Different from RF communication, which is typically mod-89
eled as a Gaussian broadcast channel with an average power90
constraint at the transmitter side, VLC typically uses intensity91
modulation and direct detection (IM/DD) due to the use92
of inexpensive light-emitting diodes (LEDs) and photodi-93
odes (PDs) as the optical transmitter and receiver, respectively.94
In VLC, since the signal is modulated onto the intensity of95
the emitted light, it must satisfy average, peak as well as96
non-negative amplitude constraints, that are imposed by the97
dynamic range of typical LEDs and practical illumination98
requirements [6], [16]–[18]. Although typical LEDs have a99
nonlinear electrical-to-optical (E/O) transfer characteristic, this100
nonlinearity can be successfully compensated by pre-distortion101
techniques [19]. Also, since the wavelength of visible light is102
hundreds of nanometers while the detection area of a typical103
PD is millions of square wavelengths, this spatial diversity104
essentially prevents the “multipath fading” effect in the VLC105
channel. Due to these fundamental differences, results on the106
secrecy capacity obtained for RF networks can not be directly107
applied to VLC networks.108
Since the secrecy capacity is related to the information109
capacity of the communication channel [8], [9], before deter-110
mining the secrecy capacity in VLC networks it is essential111
to obtain the information capacity of the VLC channel with112
average, peak and non-negative constraints. However, to the113
best of authors’ knowledge, the exact information capacity of114
the VLC channel with such constraints still remains unknown,115
even for the simplest single-input single-output (SISO) case,116
despite some lower and upper bounds have been deri-117
ved [16]–[18]. By considering one transmitter, one legitimate118
user and one eavesdropper in a VLC system, lower and upper119
bounds on the secrecy capacity of the amplitude-constrained120
Gaussian wiretap channel was recently studied in [20], with121
the use of the derived capacity lower and upper bounds in [16].122
In the same work [20], beamforming was also utilized to123
improve the secrecy capacity for the multiple-input single-124
output (MISO) VLC channel. Following this, the optimal125
beamformer design problem subject to amplitude constraints126
was further studied in [21]. The secrecy performance in127
a single-cell VLC system with only one AP was studied128
in [22]. However, the randomness of legitimate users as well as129
eavesdroppers and, more importantly, the interactions between130
them, have not been fully characterized when analyzing the131
secrecy performance in a random multiuser VLC network.132
A. Approaches and Contributions133
In this work, we aim to characterize the secrecy performance134
in an indoor multiuser VLC network by considering the135
unique properties of the VLC channel as well as the network136
layout, that differ from typical RF networks. Our approach137
builds upon a proposed three-dimensional network model with138
two independent random topologies for the VLC APs and139
mobile users. Specifically, the VLC APs are modeled by a140
two-dimensional homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP)141
in the ceiling, while the locations of users, that include142
both legitimate users and eavesdroppers, are modeled by143
another independent two-dimensional homogeneous PPP at144
the user plane. To separate eavesdroppers from legitimate 145
users, the locations of random eavesdroppers are obtained 146
from a thinned PPP. Despite the grid-like deployment of LEDs 147
in typical offices, the following observations indicate that a 148
stochastic model may be required to accurately capture the 149
distribution of APs in a VLC network. First, more and more 150
LEDs with built-in motion-detection sensors are deployed in 151
public spaces in order to reduce energy consumption. In this 152
case, some of the LEDs will be temporally switched off when 153
they are not required to provide illumination. Second, the dis- 154
tribution of ceiling lights is not necessarily equivalent to the 155
distribution of APs in a VLC network because not necessarily 156
all of the ceiling lights are simultaneously operating in the 157
communication mode, i.e., some of the ceiling lights may 158
operate in the illumination mode only when no data traffic 159
is demanded from them. In these scenarios, the distribution 160
of APs can not be accurately modeled by the grid model. 161
Instead, a stochastic thinning process built upon the grid- 162
like deployment of LEDs is more accurate, where the active- 163
ness/idleness of each AP is determined by a time-varying 164
probability distribution function (PDF). However, finding the 165
PDF of activeness/idleness of the LED requires full knowledge 166
of the users’ movement and handover characteristics, which is 167
generally complicated and not analytically tractable. In order 168
to derive analytically tractable results, the PPP model is 169
assumed in this work. For completeness, we also compare 170
the secrecy performance between the PPP model and the grid 171
model and provide a method of applying the derived analytical 172
results to estimate the secrecy performance in a conventional 173
grid-like VLC network. 174
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 175
1) When the legitimate user is served by the nearest AP 176
in its vicinity, we derive the distribution function of the 177
secrecy rate of a typical legitimate user, based on which 178
secrecy outage probability and ergodic secrecy rate are 179
obtained. To provide further insights into the secrecy 180
performance with different network parameters, lower 181
and upper bounds on the secrecy outage probability as 182
well as on the ergodic secrecy rate are given. 183
2) We enhance the secrecy performance by implementing 184
AP cooperation in a multiuser VLC network, and give 185
lower and upper bounds on the secrecy outage probabil- 186
ity and the ergodic secrecy rate. The derived analytical 187
bounds are found to be reasonably tight in general 188
and become tighter when the density of eavesdroppers 189
becomes larger. 190
3) To further enhance the secrecy performance for legiti- 191
mate users, we introduce a disk-shaped secrecy protected 192
zone around the AP in a multiuser VLC network, 193
in which the presence of eavesdroppers is prohibited. 194
In this scenario, the secrecy outage probability and the 195
ergodic secrecy rate are derived. The impact of designing 196
the protected zone with different sizes on the secrecy 197
performance is also investigated. 198
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 199
In Section II, we introduce a three-dimensional link 200
model for multiuser VLC networks and formulate the 201
information-theoretic secrecy rate expression based on a close 202
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approximation of the channel capacity. The secrecy outage203
probability and the ergodic secrecy rate with/without the AP204
cooperation are derived in Section III. We extend the analysis205
on the secrecy performance in Section IV by implementing a206
disk-shaped protected zone. Simulation results and discussions207
are provided in Section V. Finally, concluding remarks are208
given in Section VI.209
II. SYSTEM MODEL210
A. Poisson Network Model211
We consider a downlink transmission scenario of a multiuser212
VLC network with the presence of both legitimate users and213
eavesdroppers inside a three-dimensional space. The VLC214
APs are vertically fixed, since they are attached to the room215
ceiling, and their horizontal positions are modeled by a216
two-dimensional homogeneous PPP a with density λa,217
in nodes per unit area. Similarly, mobile users are assumed to218
be at a fixed height and their horizontal positions are modeled219
by another independent two-dimensional homogeneous PPP220
u with density λu. The vertical distance between the AP221
plane and the user plane is denoted by L. After adding an222
additional user at the room center,1 the new point process223
for mobile users becomes u
⋃{0}. Slivnyak’s theorem states224
that adding a user into u is equivalent to conditioning u225
on the added point, and this process does not change the226
distribution of u [23]. Therefore, the added user at the origin227
can be treated as the typical legitimate user in the study228
since it can reflect the spatial average of the performance of229
all legitimate users in the network. Among all of the users,230
there exist malicious eavesdroppers that could compromise231
the transmission privacy of ongoing legitimate links, due to232
the broadcast nature of the VLC channel. Since eavesdroppers233
typically disguise as legitimate users, it is uncertain whether234
a random user u ∈ u is a legitimate user or an eavesdropper.235
Therefore, it is assumed that u is an eavesdropper with236
probability pe and that u is a legitimate user with probability237
1 − pe. This thinned realization of u gives the point process238
for eavesdroppers, e, which is also a homogeneous PPP239
whose density can be found as λe = peλu [23]. Furthermore,240
it is assumed that eavesdroppers do not collude with each other241
so that each eavesdropper needs to decode any confidential242
messages sent to legitimate users individually. An example of243
the described multiuser VLC network is depicted in Fig. 1.244
A complete VLC channel includes both the line-of-245
sight (LOS) link and non-line-of-sight (NLOS) links, that are246
caused by light reflections from interior surfaces. However,247
in a typical indoor lighting environment, the sum signal power248
carried by NLOS components is significantly weaker than that249
carried by the LOS link [1], [24], [25]. Therefore, we will250
only focus on the LOS link in the following analysis in251
order to obtain tractable analytical results. The VLC APs252
are assumed to have a Lambertian radiation profile whose253
Lambertian order is m = −1/ log2(cos (1/2)), where 1/2254
1The room center is also called the origin. We use both expressions inter-
changeably throughout the paper since the room center has more geographical
meanings while the origin has more mathematical meanings when we apply
stochastic geometry tools in the theoretical analysis.
Fig. 1. Random network model: the legitimate user of interest is placed at
the room center; VLC APs are randomly distributed in the ceiling according
to a homogeneous PPP a; and eavesdroppers are randomly distributed on the
same plane as the legitimate user, following a homogeneous PPP e. In this
example, an indoor VLC network of size 18 × 14 × 3.5 m3 is shown.
denotes the semi-angle of the LED. The PD equipped at each 255
user is assumed to be facing vertically upwards with a field-of- 256
view (FOV) of fov. For each VLC link, the optical channel 257
direct current (DC) gain is given by [26]: 258
h = (m + 1)Aη
2πd2
cosm(φ)T (ψ)g(ψ) cos(ψ), (1) 259
where A denotes the effective detection area of the PD; η 260
is the responsivity of the PD; φ and ψ are the angle of 261
irradiance and the angle of incidence of the optical link, 262
respectively; T (ψ) represents the gain of the optical filter used 263
at the receiver; and g(ψ) represents the gain of the optical 264
concentrator. The optical concentrator gain is given by [26]: 265
g(ψ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
n2
sin2(fov)
, 0 ≤ ψ ≤ fov
0, ψ > fov
, (2) 266
where n is the reflective index of the optical concentrator, and 267
it is defined as the ratio of the speed of light in vacuum and 268
the phase velocity of light in the optical material. For visible 269
light, the typical value for n varies between 1 and 2. 270
Consider the communication link from an AP x ∈ a to 271
an eavesdropper e ∈ e. Based on the geometry [7] of the 272
VLC link, it is easy to obtain d = √‖e − x‖2 + L2, cos(φ) = 273
L/
√‖e − x‖2 + L2 and cos(ψ) = L/√‖e − x‖2 + L2. 274
Therefore, the received optical power at eavesdropper e from 275
AP x can be written as: 276
Prx(x, e) = h Ptx 277
= (m + 1)AηT (ψ)g(ψ)L
m+1
2π(‖e − x‖2 + L2)m+32
Ptx, (3) 278
where Ptx denotes the transmit optical power of the AP. 279
Similarly, the received signal power at the legitimate user can 280
be written as Prx(x, o), where o representing the origin is the 281
location of the typical user of interest. 282
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B. Secrecy Capacity Formulation283
The classic Shannon equation does not apply to VLC284
because of the average, peak and non-negative constraints on285
the modulated optical signal. Although the exact capacity of286
the VLC channel remains unknown, several upper and lower287
bounds have been derived [16]–[18]. Based on the capacity288
lower bound derived in [16], the exact channel capacity of289
VLC can be written as:290
C = 1
2
log2
(
1 + exp(1)P
2
rx
2πσ 2n
)
+ 

(
Prx
σn
)
, (4)291
where 
, as a function of the received optical-signal-to-292
noise ratio (OSNR) Prx/σn, represents a positive capacity293
gap between the exact channel capacity and the analytical294
lower bound [16], and σ 2n represents the total power of noise295
processes at the receiver. Note that inside the receiver circuit296
the dominant noise sources are the thermal noise and shot297
noise [1], [25]. The thermal noise is mainly caused by the298
preamplifier circuits while the shot noise originates mainly299
from the ambient light and/or other light sources. The signal-300
dependent shot noise, on the other hand, is relatively small,301
and hence its effect can be ignored. The overall noise process302
is generally well modeled as the additive white Gaussian303
noise (AWGN) [1], [25]. As the legitimate user and eaves-304
droppers may use different grades of receivers, for example,305
PDs with different detection areas and/or bandwidths, they are306
subject to different levels of receiver noise and are capable of307
detecting signals with different amplifying gains. Without loss308
of generality, the choice of different grades of receivers can309
be accounted for in the system model by assigning different310
noise variances at the legitimate user and the eavesdropper.311
Based on this, we denote by σ 2nb and σ 2ne the noise variance at312
the legitimate user and the noise variance at the eavesdropper,313
respectively. Unlike RF channels whose input signals are314
subject to an average power constraint [29], VLC channels315
require the input signals to satisfy a peak amplitude (optical316
power) constraint. This makes it challenging to obtain closed-317
form expressions for the secrecy capacity of a VLC link,318
even for the simplest SISO case [20], [30]. Therefore, in the319
following analysis we focus on a tight achievable lower bound320
on the secrecy capacity [20]:321
Cs ≥ [Cb − Ce]+ = Cs, (5)322
where [a]+ = max{a, 0}; Cs represents the exact secrecy323
capacity; C s represents the tight lower bound on the secrecy324
capacity given by the right-hand side of (5); Cb is the channel325
capacity of the legitimate link; and Ce is the channel capacity326
of the eavesdropper’s link.327
III. SECRECY RATE IN RANDOM VLC NETWORKS328
A. Nearest AP to Serve the Legitimate User329
Without AP cooperation, the nearest AP is typically330
assumed to serve a mobile user in the VLC network in order to331
maximize the information rate of the communication link. As a332
result, based on (4), the capacity of the legitimate link can be333
written as Cb = maxx∈a 12 log2(1+exp(1)P2rx(x, o)/2πσ 2nb)+334

 (Prx(x, o)/σnb) = 12 log2(1 + exp(1)P2rx(x0, o)/2πσ 2nb) +335

 (Prx(x0, o)/σnb), where x0 represents the location of the336
nearest AP to the origin. Since it is assumed that eavesdroppers 337
do not collude, the secrecy performance of the legitimate 338
user is limited by the eavesdropper with the highest OSNR. 339
Therefore, the lower bound on the secrecy capacity at the 340
typical legitimate user is formulated as: 341
Cs =
[
1
2
log2
(
1 + exp(1)P
2
rx(x0, o)
2πσ 2nb
)
342
− 1
2
log2
(
1 + exp(1)P
2
rx(x0, e
∗(x0))
2πσ 2ne
)
343
+ 

(
Prx(x0, o)
σnb
)
− 

(
Prx(x0, e∗(x0))
σne
)]+
, (6) 344
where e∗(x0) denotes the horizontal distance from AP x0 to 345
the nearest eavesdropper. Given that the legitimate user is 346
connected to AP x , the general solution for e∗(x), denot- 347
ing the horizontal distance between AP x and the strongest 348
eavesdropper, can be obtained by finding the location of the 349
eavesdropper e ∈ e that receives the strongest signal power: 350
e∗(x) = arg max
e∈e
Prx(x, e) 351
= arg min
e∈e
‖e − x‖, (7) 352
where the last step is obtained based on the monotonic 353
property of (3). By utilizing fractional frequency reuse [28] 354
or orthogonal multiple access techniques, the achievable data 355
rate can be quantified through the received signal-to-noise 356
ratio (SNR) without the side effect of co-channel inter- 357
ference (CSI). As a result, OSNR of Prx/σn > 30 dB 358
can be achieved at typical illumination levels [25], [27], 359
where 
(Prx/σn) is found to be comparatively small [16]– 360
[18]. Therefore, we focus on the high OSNR regime, where 361

(Prx(x0, o)/σnb)  1/2 log2(exp(1)P2rx(x0, o)/2πσ 2nb) and 362

(Prx(x0, e∗(x0))/σne)  1/2 log2(exp(1)P2rx(x0, e∗(x0))/ 363
2πσ 2ne). Based on this, (6) can be further approximated to: 364
Cs ≈
[
1
2
log2
(
P2rx(x0, o)
P2rx(x0, e∗(x))
)
+log2
(
σne
σnb
)]+
= Rs. (8) 365
To distinguish from the exact secrecy capacity, we define in (8) 366
Rs as the achievable secrecy rate. Due to the lack of the com- 367
plete knowledge of the exact secrecy capacity Cs, the secrecy 368
rate Rs is of interest in this paper. It is shown in (8) that a non- 369
negative secrecy rate can only be achieved when the legitimate 370
user achieves a higher SNR than the strongest eavesdropper. 371
In the case that a eavesdropper receives signals from a less- 372
degraded link than the legitimate user, the achievable secrecy 373
rate drops to zero. It can also be seen from (8) that when 374
the legitimate user and the eavesdropper use different grades 375
of receivers, the achieved secrecy capacity at the legitimate 376
user is offset by a constant, whose value is proportional to the 377
logarithm of σne/σnb. Therefore, without loss of generality, 378
σnb = σne is assumed in the following analysis. 379
Theorem 1: When the legitimate user is served by the 380
nearest AP in its vicinity, the cummulative distribution func- 381
tion (CDF) of the secrecy rate Rs is given by: 382
FRs(v) = 1 −
1
1 + λeλa 4
v
m+3
exp
(
−πλe
(
4
v
m+3 − 1
)
L2
)
, (9) 383
where v ≥ 0. 384
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Proof: According to (8), we have Rs ≥ 0. Therefore,385
the CDF of the secrecy rate Rs can be calculated by:386
FRs (v) = P [Rs ≤ v]387
= P
[
P2rx(x0, o)
P2rx(x0, e∗(x0))
≤ 4v
]
388
= P
[
‖e∗(x0) − x0‖ ≤
√
βx20 + (β − 1)L2
]
, (10)389
where β = 4v/(m+3). Since the legitimate user is served by390
the nearest AP, the PDF of x0 is [31]:391
fx0(x0) = 2πλax0 exp
(
−πλax20
)
. (11)392
When conditioned on distance x0, (10) is the probability that393
no eavesdroppers exist within a circle, which is centered at394
x0 and has a radius of
√
βx20 + (β − 1)L2. Such probability395
can be calculated using the void probability of PPP [32]. As a396
result, (10) can be calculated as:397
FRs(v)398
= Ex0
[
P
[
‖e∗(x0) − x0‖ ≤
√
βx20 + (β − 1)L2
∣
∣
∣
∣ x0
]]
399
=
∫ ∞
0
P
[
‖e∗(x0)−x0‖ ≤
√
βx20 +(β−1)L2
∣
∣
∣
∣ x0
]
fx0(x0)dx0400
=
∫ ∞
0
(
1 − exp
(
−πλe
(
βx20 + (β − 1)L2
)))
2πλax0401
× exp
(
−πλax20
)
dx0402
= 1 − 1
1 + λeλa β
exp
(
−πλe (β − 1) L2
)
. (12)403
After plugging β = 4v/(m+3) into (12), we obtain (9).404
Corollary 1: When the legitimate user is served by the n-th405
nearest AP in its vicinity, the CDF of the secrecy rate is:406
FRs(v) = 1−
(
1
1 + λeλa 4
v
m+3
)n
exp
(
−πλe
(
4
v
m+3 − 1
)
L2
)
,407
(13)408
where v ≥ 0.409
Proof: The distance distribution of the legitimate user to410
the n-th nearest AP is given by [31]:411
fxn (xn) =
2(πλax2n)n
xn(n)
exp
(
−πλax2n
)
. (14)412
By using (14) and following similar steps as in (12), (13) can413
be obtained.414
The secrecy outage probability, denoted by pso, is defined415
as the probability that the secrecy rate is below a target secrecy416
rate R¯s. Mathematically, it is formulated as:417
pso = P
[
Rs ≤ R¯s
] = FRs (R¯s), (15)418
which can be obtained directly from Theorem 1.419
Corollary 2: When the legitimate user is served by the420
nearest AP in its vicinity, the secrecy outage probability is421
lower bounded by:422
pLBso = 1 − exp
(
−πλe
(
4
R¯s
m+3 − 1
)
L2
)
, (16)423
when the density of VLC APs approaches infinity.424
Proof: (16) can be obtained from pLBso = 425
limλa→∞ pso. 426
Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 provide an important guideline 427
for the design of VLC networks: installing more VLC APs 428
can help decrease the secrecy outage probability of a typical 429
legitimate user; however, when the density of APs reaches 430
a certain level, further increasing the density of APs is 431
not meaningful since it can no longer enhance the secrecy 432
performance. In other words, it is impossible for a legitimate 433
user in the network to simultaneously achieve a target secrecy 434
rate R¯s and have an outage probability lower than pLBso (R¯s). 435
Given a target secrecy rate R¯s and a target outage proba- 436
bility p¯so > pLBso (R¯s), this requirement can be achieved by 437
installing more APs in the network so that the density of 438
APs satisfies λa ≥ λe (1 − p¯so) 4R¯s/(m+3)
/(
p¯so − pLBso (R¯s)
)
. 439
From (9) and (16), it is shown that reducing the semi-angle 440
of the LED, or equivalently increasing the Lambertian order, 441
can also help improve the secrecy performance of the network. 442
Nevertheless, the actual choice of the semi-angle of the LED 443
should also satisfy the illumination requirement. 444
Theorem 2: When the legitimate user is served by the 445
nearest AP in its vicinity, the ergodic secrecy rate at the 446
legitimate user is: 447
E[Rs] = m + 3ln(4)
[
exp
(
π(λe + λa)L2
)
Ei
(
−π(λe + λa)L2
)
448
− exp
(
πλe L2
)
Ei
(
−πλe L2
) ]
, (17) 449
where Ei(a) = − ∫ ∞−a exp(−t)/tdt is the exponential integral 450
function [33]. 451
Proof: The ergodic secrecy rate can be calculated based 452
on the CDF of Rs: 453
E[Rs] =
∫ ∞
0
(
1 − FRs(v)
)
dv 454
= m+3
ln(4)
∫ ∞
1
1
β
(
1+ λeλa β
) exp
(
−πλe (β−1) L2
)
dβ 455
= m + 3
ln(4)
[ ∫ ∞
1
exp
(−πλe (β − 1) L2
)
β
dβ 456
−
∫ ∞
1
exp
(−πλe (β − 1) L2
)
β + λaλe
dβ
]
, (18) 457
where the integration variable has been changed from v to β. 458
After applying [33, eq. 3.351.5], the first integration in (18) 459
can be calculated as: 460
∫ ∞
1
exp
(−πλe (β−1) L2
)
β
dβ = − exp
(
πλe L2
)
Ei
(
−πλe L2
)
. 461
(19) 462
After applying [33, eq. 3.352.2], the second integration in (18) 463
can be calculated as: 464
∫ ∞
1
exp
(−πλe (β − 1) L2
)
β + λaλe
dβ 465
= − exp
(
π(λe+λa)L2
)
Ei
(
−π(λe+λa)L2
)
. (20) 466
After plugging (19) and (20) into (18), (17) is obtained. 467
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Corollary 3: When the legitimate user is served by the468
nearest AP in its vicinity, the ergodic secrecy rate at the469
legitimate user is upper bounded by:470
RUBs =
m + 3
ln(4)
(
− exp
(
πλe L2
)
Ei
(
−πλe L2
))
. (21)471
Proof: The upper bound on the secrecy rate can be472
obtained from RUBs = limλa→∞ E[Rs]. Based on the equality473
lim
λa→∞
exp
(
π(λe + λa)L2
)
Ei
(
−π(λe + λa)L2
)
= 0, (22)474
we obtain (21).475
Theorem 2 and Corollary 3 indicate that increasing the density476
of VLC APs can help enhance the ergodic secrecy rate of477
a typical legitimate user. However, when the density of APs478
exceeds a certain level, installing more APs can not enhance479
the ergodic secrecy rate any further. While satisfying the480
illumination requirement, using LEDs with a smaller semi-481
angle can increase the ergodic secrecy rate of a typical user.482
Specifically, it can be seen from (17) and (21) that a linear483
relationship exists between the ergodic secrecy rate and the484
Lambertian order m. Given the choice of LEDs, the maximum485
ergodic secrecy rate can not exceed the upper bound given486
in (21). To achieve a target ergodic secrecy rate R¯s, whose487
value is smaller than RUBs , the density of APs needs to488
exceed λ∗a , where λ∗a is the numerical solution for λa to equa-489
tion exp
(
π (λe + λa)L2
)
Ei
(−π (λe + λa)L2
) = ln(4)R¯s/490
(m + 3) + exp (πλe L2
)
Ei
(−πλe L2
)
.491
B. Optimal AP to Serve the Legitimate User492
Due to the randomness of eavesdroppers, it is not always493
optimal to serve the legitimate user with the nearest AP. For494
example, if the eavesdropper is close to the nearest AP around495
the legitimate user but far away from the second nearest496
AP around the legitimate user, selecting the second nearest497
AP to serve the legitimate user may yield a higher secrecy498
rate. Therefore, with the cooperation among APs, the secrecy499
performance at legitimate users can be further enhanced.500
However, it should be noted that selecting the optimal AP to501
serve legitimate users requires the knowledge of the location502
information of all eavesdroppers at the central controller,503
which can be achieved with indoor sensing and localization504
technologies. Despite the additional implementation and com-505
putation complexity, this optimal scheme yields an enhanced506
secrecy rate, which is useful for network designers to quantify507
the secrecy performance provided by the nearest AP and508
optimal AP and to decide which scheme is more suitable for509
practical implementations. When the optimal AP is selected510
to serve the legitimate user, the secrecy rate is formulated as:511
Rs =
[
max
x∈a
{
1
2
log2
(
P2rx(x, o)
P2rx(x, e∗(x))
)}]+
. (23)512
Due to the intractability of the secrecy rate expression given513
in (23), the distribution function of Rs is hard to obtain. In the514
following, we provide two analytical bounds on the CDF of515
the secrecy rate.516
Corollary 4: With the cooperation among VLC APs, 517
the CDF of the secrecy rate at the typical legitimate user is 518
lower bounded by: 519
FRs(v) ≥ exp
(
−λa
λe
4−
v
m+3 exp
(
−πλe
(
4
v
m+3 − 1
)
L2
))
, 520
(24) 521
and is upper bounded by: 522
FRs(v) ≤ 1−
1
1 + λeλa 4
v
m+3
exp
(
−πλe
(
4
v
m+3 − 1
)
L2
)
. (25) 523
Proof: With the cooperation of VLC APs, the CDF of the 524
secrecy rate can be calculated with the help of the probability 525
generating functional (PGFL) of the PPP [23]: 526
FRs(v) 527
= P
[
max
x∈a
{
1
2
log2
(
P2rx(x, o)
P2rx(x, e∗(x))
)}
≤ v
]
528
= P
[
1
2
log2
(
P2rx(x, o)
P2rx(x, e∗(x))
)
≤ v,∀x ∈ a
]
529
= Ee
⎡
⎣Ea
⎡
⎣
∏
x∈a
1
(
‖e − x‖ ≤
√
βl2 + (β − 1)L2
)
⎤
⎦
⎤
⎦ 530
= Ee
[
exp
[
−λa
∫
R2
1
[
‖e−x‖ >
√
βl2+(β−1)L2
∣
∣
∣
∣ x
]
dx
]]
, 531
(26) 532
where 1(A) = 1 with event A being true, and zero otherwise. 533
Based on Jensen’s inequality, the lower bound can be calcu- 534
lated as: 535
FRs (v) ≥ exp
[
−2πλa
∫ ∞
0
P
[
‖e−x‖ >
√
βx2+(β−1)L2
∣
∣
∣
∣ x
]
536
× xdx0
]
. (27) 537
After calculating the integration part in (27), the lower bound 538
result in Corollary 4 is obtained. The upper bound can be 539
obtained straightforwardly from the following inequality: 540
[
max
x∈a
{
log2
(
P2rx(x, o)
P2rx(x, e∗(x))
)}]+
≥
[
log2
(
P2rx(x0, o)
P2rx(x0, e∗(x0))
)]+
. 541
(28) 542
In other words, choosing the nearest AP to serve the legitimate 543
user is sub-optimal, which gives an upper bound on the CDF 544
of the secrecy capacity. Therefore, the upper bound expression 545
shown in (25) can be obtained directly from Theorem 1. 546
Based on the upper bound on the CDF of the secrecy rate, 547
a lower bound on the ergodic secrecy rate can be obtained, 548
as given in (17). An upper bound on the ergodic secrecy 549
rate can be obtained by integrating the complement of the 550
CDF of Rs: 551
E[Rs] 552
=
∫ ∞
0
(
1 − FRs(v)
)
dv 553
≤ m+3
ln(4)
∫ ∞
1
(
1−exp
(
− λa
λeβ
exp
(
−πλe (β−1) L2
))) 1
β
dβ. 554
(29) 555
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Fig. 2. Random network model with a secrecy protected zone. In this model,
each VLC AP has a disk-shaped protected zone, which is centered around the
AP and has a radius of D on the user plane. For simplicity, only the protected
zone around the nearest AP is drawn.
Because of the nested exponential function in (29), a closed-556
form expression is not available. However, (29) can be557
efficiently calculated using numerical methods.558
IV. ENHANCING SECRECY RATE IN VLC559
NETWORKS WITH A PROTECTED ZONE560
In order to further enhance the secrecy performance of561
legitimate users in VLC networks, a strategy named the “pro-562
tected zone” [34] can be implemented. As depicted in Fig. 2,563
a protected zone is an eavesdropper-free area (on the user564
plane), which allows only legitimate users to enter. If any565
eavesdropper enters the protected zone, such behavior will be566
made aware to the AP, and the AP will notify the legitimate567
user and temporarily stop the communication. A practical568
implementation of the protected zone in VLC networks can be569
achieved with motion sensors that are already built in modern570
energy-efficient lighting devices. We acknowledge that there571
might be means to break the suggested enforcement of the572
protected zone. However, a deeper investigation of this aspect573
is outside the scope of this work. A secrecy protected zone574
can be completely described by its center, i.e., its associated575
AP, and a security radius D. The security radius is defined576
as the smallest horizontal distance between the AP and any577
eavesdroppers that are undetectable.578
Lemma 1: Given that the horizontal distance between the579
nearest AP to the legitimate user is x0, the PDF of the hori-580
zontal distance between this AP and the nearest eavesdropper,581
that is outside the protected zone, is:582
f‖e∗(x0)−x0‖(α) = 2πλeα exp
(
−πλe(α2 − D2)
)
, (30)583
for α ≥ D, and zero otherwise.584
Proof: (30) can be obtained using the void probability of585
PPP [32].586
With Lemma 1, we are ready to obtain the CDF of the587
secrecy rate enhanced by the protected zone.588
Corollary 5: When the legitimate user is served by the 589
nearest AP in its vicinity, which has a protected zone with 590
radius D, the CDF of the enhanced secrecy rate is given by: 591
FRs (v) = 1 −
exp
(
−πλe
((
4
v
m+3 − 1
)
L2 − D2
))
1 + λeλa 4
v
m+3
, (31) 592
for v ≥ m+32 log2
(
D2/L2 + 1), and 593
FRs (v) =
exp
(
−πλa
(
D2 −
(
4
v
m+3 −1
)
L2
)
4−
v
m+3
)
1 + λaλe 4−
v
m+3
, (32) 594
for 0 ≤ v < m+32 log2
(
D2/L2 + 1). 595
Proof: Since the protected zone has a radius D, the min- 596
imum distance between the nearest eavesdropper and the AP 597
is D. Therefore, 598
e∗(x0) = arg min
e∈e,e/∈B(x0,D)
‖e − x0‖, (33) 599
where B(x0, D) denotes the disk-shaped area centered at x0 600
with radius D. Due to the exclusive region in (33), the deriva- 601
tion of the CDF of the enhanced secrecy rate needs to be 602
separated into two scenarios. First, when
√
(β − 1)L2 ≥ D, 603
i.e., v ≥ m+32 log2
(
D2/L2 + 1), the CDF of the enhanced 604
secrecy rate can be calculated as: 605
FRs (v) =
∫ ∞
0
(
1 − exp
(
−πλe
(
βx20 + (β − 1)L2 − D2
)))
606
×2πλax0 exp
(
−πλax20
)
dx0, (34) 607
which gives the result in (31). Second, when
√
(β − 1)L2 < 608
D, i.e., 0 ≤ v < m+32 log2
(
D2/L2 + 1), the CDF of the 609
enhanced secrecy rate can be calculated as: 610
FRs (v) =
∫ ∞
√
D2−(β−1)L2
β
2πλax0 exp
(
−πλax20
)
611
×
(
1 − exp
(
−πλe
(
βx20 + (β − 1)L2 − D2
)))
dx0 612
+
∫
√
D2−(β−1)L2
β
0
2πλax0 exp
(
−πλax20
)
613
× P [e∗(x0) ∈ B(x0, D)
]
dx0, (35) 614
in which the critical point x0 =
√
(D2 − (β − 1)L2)/β is 615
found by solving
√
βx20 + (β − 1)L2 = D. Since e∗(x0) /∈ 616
B(x0, D), P
[
e∗(x0) ∈ B(x0, D)
] = 0, and the second inte- 617
gration in (35) reduces to zero. After calculating the first 618
integration in (35), we obtain (32). To this end, the proof is 619
completed. 620
It can be seen from Corollary 5 that the radius of the 621
protected zone has a strong impact on the CDF of the secrecy 622
rate and on the secrecy outage probability. On the one hand, 623
if the radius of the protected zone is small enough so that the 624
target secrecy rate satisfies R¯s ≥ m+32 log2
(
D2/L2 + 1), given 625
a fixed density of eavesdroppers, the secrecy outage probability 626
is lower bounded by: 627
pLBso = 1 − exp
(
−πλe
((
4
R¯s
m+3 − 1
)
L2 − D2
))
, (36) 628
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which is obtained when the density of the APs goes to629
infinity. On the other hand, if the radius of the protected630
zone is large enough so that the target secrecy rate satisfies631
R¯s < m+32 log2
(
D2/L2 + 1), increasing the density of VLC632
APs can efficiently reduce the secrecy outage probability, and633
the worst-case scenario of the secrecy outage probability is634
upper bounded by:635
pUBso = exp
(
−πλa
(
D2 −
(
4
R¯s
m+3 − 1
)
L2
)
4−
R¯s
m+3
)
, (37)636
which is obtained by letting λe approach infinity.637
Corollary 5 provides an essential guideline to network638
designers so that they can design a suitable protected zone639
around each VLC AP in order to provide legitimate users640
with guaranteed secrecy service. Specifically, for legitimate641
users to achieve a target secrecy rate R¯s with a target642
secrecy outage probability p¯so, network designers can set up643
the protected zone with radius no smaller than D∗, where644
D∗ = ((4R¯s/(m+3) − 1)L2 + (ln(1 − p¯so) + ln(1 + 4R¯s/(m+3)645
λe/λa))/πλe)
1/2 for p¯so ≥ 1 − (1 + 4R¯s/(m+3)λe/λa)−1,646
and D∗ = ((4R¯s/(m+3) − 1)L2 − (ln p¯so + ln(1 +647
4−R¯s/(m+3)λa/λe))4R¯s/(m+3)/πλa)1/2 for p¯so < 1 − (1 +648
4R¯s/(m+3)λe/λa)−1. Also, it is evident that a more stringent649
secrecy requirement with a larger R¯s and/or a smaller p¯so650
requires the implementation of a larger secrecy protected zone.651
Theorem 3: When the legitimate user is served by the652
nearest AP in its vicinity, which has a protected zone with653
radius D, the enhanced ergodic secrecy rate at the typical654
legitimate user is:655
E[Rs]656
= m + 3
ln(4)
[
− exp
(
πλe
(
L2 + D2
))
Ei
(
−πλe
(
L2 + D2
))
657
+ ln
(
D2
L2
+ 1
)]
+ m + 3
ln(4)
exp
(
πλa L2
) [
Ei
(
−πλa L2
)
658
+ exp
(
πλe
(
L2 + D2
))
Ei
(
−π(λa + λe)
(
L2 + D2
))
659
− Ei
(
−πλa
(
L2 + D2
)) ]
. (38)660
Proof: Based on Corollary 5, the enhanced ergodic rate661
can be calculated by integrating the complement of the CDF.662
Since the CDF has different expressions at different regions,663
the integration should be separated into two parts:664
E[Rs]665
= m + 3
ln(4)
∫ D2
L2
+1
1
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝1 −
exp
(
−πλa
(
D2−(β−1)L2)
β
)
1 + λaλe 1β
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠
1
β
dβ666
+ m + 3
ln(4)
∫ ∞
D2
L2
+1
exp
(−πλe
(
(β−1) L2−D2))
β+ λeλa β2
dβ, (39)667
where for simplicity the variable of integration has been668
changed from v to β. The first integration in (39) can be669
simplified to: 670
∫ D2
L2
+1
1
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝1 −
exp
(
−πλa
(
D2−(β−1)L2)
β
)
1 + λaλe 1β
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠
1
β
dβ 671
= ln
(
D2
L2
+ 1
)
+ exp
(
πλa L2
)
672
×
∫ D2
L2
+1
1
exp
(
−πλa
(
L2+D2)
β
)
β + λaλe
dβ, (40) 673
in which the integration part can be obtained as: 674
∫ D2
L2
+1
1
exp
(
−πλa
(
L2+D2)
β
)
β + λaλe
dβ 675
= Ei
(
−πλa L2
)
− Ei
(
−πλa
(
L2 + D2
))
676
+ exp
(
πλe
(
L2 + D2
))
Ei
(
−π(λa + λe)
(
L2+D2
))
677
− exp
(
πλe
(
L2+D2
))
Ei
(
−πλa L2 − πλe
(
L2+D2
))
. 678
(41) 679
Similarly, the second integration in (39) can be simplified to: 680
∫ ∞
D2
L2
+1
exp
(−πλe
(
(β − 1) L2 − D2))
β + λeλa β2
dβ 681
= exp
(
πλe
(
L2 + D2
)) [ ∫ ∞
D2
L2
+1
exp
(−πλeβL2
)
β
dβ 682
−
∫ ∞
D2
L2
+1
exp
(−πλeβL2
)
β + λaλe
dβ
]
. (42) 683
Applying [33, eq. 3.352.2], the two integrations in (42) can 684
be calculated as: 685
∫ ∞
D2
L2
+1
exp
(−πλeβL2
)
β
dβ = −Ei
(
−πλe
(
L2+D2
))
, (43) 686
and 687
∫ ∞
D2
L2
+1
exp
(−πλeβL2
)
β + λaλe
dβ 688
= − exp
(
πλa L2
)
Ei
(
−πλe L2
(
λa
λe
+ D
2
L2
+1
))
. (44) 689
Combining (40) – (44) gives the result shown in (38), which 690
completes the proof. 691
Note that the expression for the ergodic secrecy rate 692
in Theorem 3 can be simplified to the one given in Theorem 2 693
when D = 0. Also, it is shown in Theorem 3 that the ergodic 694
secrecy rate scales linearly with the Lambertian order m, 695
regardless of the size of the protected zone. Given the choice 696
of LEDs, the density of APs and the density of eavesdroppers, 697
a target ergodic secrecy capacity R¯s can be achieved through 698
the implementation of a protected zone with radius D∗, where 699
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TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
D∗ is the numerical solution for D by letting (38) equal R¯s.700
Since the expression in (38) monotonically increases with701
respect to D, the numerical solution for D∗ is unique.702
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS703
A. Results Based on the PPP Model704
In this section, we use a MATLAB implementation to705
validate the derived results. Simulation results are obtained706
by averaging 20, 000 realizations of Monte Carlo simulations.707
A typical office of size 18 × 14 × 3.5 m3 is considered,708
as illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2. If not otherwise specified,709
the network parameters used for the simulation setup are710
described in Table I.711
First, we consider the scenario where the legitimate user is712
served by the nearest AP in its vicinity, without the imple-713
mentation of the secrecy protected zone. Therefore, malicious714
eavesdroppers can be horizontally as close as possible to the715
AP that serves the legitimate user. By fixing the density of716
eavesdroppers (λe = 0.2), the secrecy outage probability at717
the typical legitimate user is evaluated at different values of718
the AP density, as shown in Fig. 3. It can be seen that,719
when λa is small, increasing the density of VLC APs can720
efficiently reduce the secrecy outage probability at the legiti-721
mate user. However, when λa is large, further increasing the722
density of VLC APs only slightly reduces the secrecy outage723
probability. For example, given that the target secrecy rate is724
R¯s = 1 bit/s/Hz, increasing λa from 0.1 to 1 can cause the725
secrecy outage probability to drop by 0.3. In comparison, when726
λa is increased from 1 to 10, the secrecy outage probability727
only drops by 0.1. Also, it is shown that a lower bound on728
the secrecy outage probability exists even if the density of729
VLC APs approaches infinity. This result is in agreement730
with Corollary 2. In Fig. 4, the ergodic secrecy rate is plotted731
against the density of APs. It is shown that the ergodic secrecy732
rate at the legitimate user drops when the density of eaves-733
droppers increases. Given a fixed density of eavesdroppers,734
increasing the density of VLC APs can efficiently enhance the735
ergodic secrecy rate when λa is small. However, the ergodic736
secrecy rate of the legitimate user tends to saturate at high737
AP densities. As a result, increasing the density of VLC APs738
when λa is large does not bring a significant incrementation739
to the ergodic secrecy rate. Instead, increasing the density of740
APs when λa is small is more meaningful.741
Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability versus VLC AP density. The legitimate
user is served by the nearest AP in its vicinity. λe = 0.2.
Fig. 4. Ergodic secrecy rate versus VLC AP density. The legitimate user is
served by the nearest AP in its vicinity.
Second, we consider the scenario where the legitimate user 742
is served by the optimal AP when APs are cooperated in the 743
network. For the typical legitimate user, the optimal AP is 744
not necessarily the nearest one, depending on the locations 745
of potential eavesdroppers. With the cooperation among VLC 746
APs, the optimal AP that brings the highest secrecy rate to 747
the legitimate user is selected. For Monte Carlo simulations, 748
the optimal AP is found out through the exhaustive search 749
method. In Fig. 5, the secrecy outage probability is plotted 750
against different eavesdropper densities, and it can be seen 751
that the simulation results are well bounded by the derived 752
analytical results. On the one hand, by assuming that the 753
optimal AP is the nearest one, we underestimate the secrecy 754
rate at the legitimate user. As a result, this assumption leads to 755
an upper bound on the secrecy outage probability. On the other 756
hand, the lower bound on the secrecy outage probability is 757
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Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probability versus eavesdropper density. The legiti-
mate user is served by the optimal AP. R¯s = 0.5 bit/s/Hz.
Fig. 6. Ergodic secrecy rate versus eavesdropper density. The legitimate user
is served by the optimal AP.
obtained from Jensen’s inequality, as described in Corollary 4.758
Comparing the lower bound with the upper bound, it can be759
seen that the lower bound is closer to the simulation results.760
It is also shown in Fig. 5 that both theoretical bounds on761
the secrecy outage probability are reasonably tight when the762
eavesdropper density is large. In Fig. 6, the ergodic secrecy763
rate at the legitimate user is computed for different values of764
the eavesdropper density. It should be noted that assuming the765
optimal AP is the nearest one gives the lower bound on the766
ergodic secrecy rate in Fig. 6, which corresponds to the upper767
bound on the secrecy outage probability in Fig. 5. Again, both768
analytical bounds become tighter as the eavesdropper density769
increases. Based on the results shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6,770
we can conclude that the optimal AP that maximizes the771
secrecy performance at the legitimate user is not necessarily772
the nearest one. To investigate deeper, we show in Fig. 7773
Fig. 7. Probability mass function (PMF) of the index of the optimal AP.
λe = 0.2.
the probability mass function (PMF) of the index of the 774
optimal AP that maximizes the secrecy rate at the legitimate 775
user. Index i relates to the i -th nearest neighboring AP to 776
the legitimate user. For example, index 1 corresponds to the 777
nearest AP, index 2 corresponds to the second nearest AP, and 778
so on. It is shown in Fig. 7 that, compared to other neighboring 779
APs, the nearest AP is most likely the optimal one. However, 780
it is also possible that the optimal AP is the second nearest, 781
third nearest, etc. Fig. 7 also shows that with a smaller value 782
of λa, it is more likely that the nearest AP is the optimal one, 783
which therefore explains why the analytical bounds are tighter 784
for smaller values of λa, as observed in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. 785
Third, we consider the scenario where the legitimate user 786
is served by the nearest AP in its vicinity, with the imple- 787
mentation of a secrecy protected zone. It is assumed that any 788
malicious eavesdroppers that are inside the protected zone can 789
be detected by the AP so that these eavesdroppers do not cause 790
any secrecy information loss at the legitimate user. As a result, 791
the secrecy information loss at the legitimate user is caused 792
by the eavesdroppers that are outside the protected zone only. 793
In Fig. 8, the secrecy outage probability is plotted against the 794
density of VLC APs. It is shown that, for a given target secrecy 795
rate, the secrecy outage probability decreases as the AP density 796
increases. However, when λa is large, further increasing the 797
density of VLC APs only slightly reduces the secrecy outage 798
probability. Also, it is shown that there exists a lower bound 799
on the secrecy outage probability when λa approaches infinity. 800
After implementing a secrecy protected zone with radius D, 801
the secrecy outage probability is reduced significantly. More 802
specifically, when λa = 1, λe = 0.2 and the target secrecy rate 803
is R¯s = 2 bit/s/Hz, implementing a secrecy protected zone 804
with radius D = 1 m reduces the secrecy outage probability 805
by 0.2. If the secrecy protected zone has a radius of D = 2 m, 806
the secrecy outage probability can be reduced to nearly zero. 807
It is also shown in Fig. 8 that, with a sufficiently large 808
protected area, the secrecy outage probability is no longer 809
bounded at the lower end, i.e., increasing the density of VLC 810
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Fig. 8. Secrecy outage probability versus VLC AP density. The legitimate
user is served by the nearest AP in its vicinity, and eavesdroppers are outside
the protected zone with radius D. λe = 0.2.
Fig. 9. Secrecy outage probability versus eavesdropper density. The legiti-
mate user is served by the nearest AP in its vicinity, and eavesdroppers are
outside the protected zone with radius D. λa = 0.5.
APs can efficiently reduce the secrecy outage probability to811
zero. In Fig. 9, we fix λa = 0.5 and evaluate the impact of812
the eavesdropper density on the secrecy outage probability.813
It can be seen that, without the protected zone, the secrecy814
outage probability can be as large as one if the eavesdropper815
density is sufficiently high. However, with the implementation816
of a protected zone, the worst-case scenario of the secrecy817
outage probability can be limited below a certain level. For818
example, when the target secrecy rate is R¯s = 2 bit/s/Hz and819
the protected zone has a radius of D = 2 m, the worst-case820
secrecy outage probability at the legitimate user does not821
exceed 0.12, regardless of the eavesdropper density. To fur-822
ther investigate the impact of the protected zone, we show823
in Fig. 10 the ergodic secrecy rate against the radius of824
the protected zone while fixing the eavesdropper density to825
λe = 0.2. The slope of the curve shows that a very small826
protected area brings only marginal improvement on the827
Fig. 10. Ergodic secrecy rate versus the radius of the protected zone. The
legitimate user is served by the nearest AP in its vicinity. λe = 0.2.
secrecy performance. However, by increasing the size of 828
the protected zone further, the secrecy performance at the 829
legitimate user can be enhanced significantly. Specifically, 830
when λa = 1 and 1/2 = 30◦, increasing the radius of the 831
protected zone from 0 to 1 m increases the ergodic secrecy 832
rate by 0.6 bit/s/Hz. In contrast, increasing the radius of 833
the protected zone from 1 to 2 m can increase the ergodic 834
secrecy rate by 1.9 bit/s/Hz. In Fig. 10, it is also shown that 835
using more directional LEDs, i.e., LEDs with a smaller semi- 836
angle, enhances the secrecy performance at the legitimate user. 837
However, the actual choice of LEDs should also take practical 838
illumination requirements into consideration. 839
B. PPP Model vs. Grid Model 840
In the following, we compare the secrecy performance 841
between the stochastic PPP model and the deterministic grid 842
model. For the grid model, it implicitly assumes that the 843
number of APs, as well as their locations in the network, are 844
fixed and known. As shown in Fig. 11 and Fig. 12, we use a 845
hexagonal-shaped grid to model the locations of APs within 846
the same indoor space. A total number of 31 APs (represented 847
by red triangles) are considered, and without loss of generality 848
the secrecy performance is studied by focusing on the central 849
hexagonal cell. A legitimate user (represented by the green 850
circle) is randomly distributed within the central cell and is 851
served by the central AP. The eavesdroppers (represented by 852
blue squares) are assumed to follow a Poisson distribution 853
with intensity λe. To allow for a fair comparison between 854
the PPP model and the grid model, the density of APs in 855
the PPP model is set to 0.12 so that the expected number 856
of APs in the PPP model equals the total number of APs 857
in the grid model. It can be seen from Fig. 11 that the 858
PPP model and the grid model yield similar results for the 859
secrecy outage probability. Both curves have similar shapes 860
and trends, especially for higher target secrecy rates and 861
with larger eavesdropper densities. In general, the grid model 862
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Fig. 11. Secrecy outage probability comparison between the PPP model and
the grid model. λa = 0.12.
Fig. 12. Ergodic secrecy rate comparison between the PPP model and the
grid model. λa = 0.12.
provides slightly superior coverage performance than the PPP863
model because of its more regularized cell shapes. With the864
implementation of a secrecy protected zone, we compare865
in Fig. 12 the achieved ergodic secrecy rate between the PPP866
model and the grid model. The configuration of the grid model867
in Fig. 12 is the same as that in Fig. 11, except that the868
eavesdroppers are prohibited in the circular protected zone869
centered around the central AP. Results show that both models870
yield close ergodic secrecy rates, especially for networks with871
more populated eavesdroppers.872
VI. CONCLUSION873
In this work, we studied the performance of physical-layer874
secrecy in a three-dimensional multiuser VLC network. With875
the use of mathematical tools from stochastic geometry, analyt-876
ical expressions for the secrecy outage probability, the ergodic877
secrecy rate, as well as their lower and upper bounds, are878
derived in tractable forms and verified through Monte Carlo 879
simulations. Impacts of AP cooperation and the implementa- 880
tion of a secrecy protected zone on the secrecy performance 881
have also been investigated. Results show that cooperating 882
neighboring APs can enhance the secrecy performance of VLC 883
networks, but only to a limited extent. We also show that 884
building a secrecy protected zone around the AP significantly 885
improves the network secrecy performance. 886
Justifying the application of the PPP model to the perfor- 887
mance analysis of VLC networks is an important research 888
direction. Also, improved stochastic models may be developed 889
in the future to more accurately capture the spatial distribution 890
of APs in a real network deployment. 891
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